Winner of the 2015 CNMT Essay Competition

Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships: Adrift in Inflationary Waters

A Failing Policy for Failed States: The EU and Maritime Migration out of Libya

Reflections on Canada, the State, the Nation and the Navy

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• provide a public forum for the discussion of Canada’s naval and maritime policies; and
• provide a source for the public examination of Canadian naval and maritime history and for the development of lessons learned.

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BOOK REVIEWS

VOLUME 11, NUMBER 2 (2015) CANADIAN NAVAL REVIEW 1

A boat transporting migrants/refugees in distress in the Mediterranean Sea.
Fact and Fiction in Naval Procurement

It was a dark and stormy night.... This really is an editorial and not the start of a novel but today in any story or commentary on Canadian defence procurement, it is hard to separate fact from fiction. I could continue the opening line with ... and two politicians sat in a cave and write a rant about communications failures at high levels of government. I will spare you that and look instead at the web of confusion being woven in a corner of the cave about the navy’s shipbuilding program, the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS).

Army trucks and F-35 fighters make good fodder for sceptical and cynical journalists, but the NSPS has become a veritable feast. Why is such a far-sighted and logical program turning into a train wreck? At least, that is what the media and some defence commentators would have us believe. Maybe some of the expressed concerns are valid, maybe some are sheer nonsense. Let’s look and see.

The key concerns seem to be: (1) that paying off both fleet support ships and the three remaining Iroquois-class destroyers has left the RCN as a glorified Coast Guard; (2) funding constraints, mainly the declining purchasing power of the money allocated in 2011, are already prompting a drop in numbers of hulls to be built, particularly the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS); (3) Canada's shipyards are not up to the job; and (4) the present shipbuilding 'shambles' is entirely a function of politics, especially the lack of priority given to retaining the capabilities built up so carefully and used so effectively in the first two post-Cold War decades. The standard old chestnut of the respective costs of buying offshore versus building the ships in Canada always manages to find its way into any such discussion.

Is fleet capability really declining to insignificance? Anybody with any real knowledge of RCN history or experience of its operations during and after the Cold War would dismiss such claims as abject nonsense. Why?

The RCN has nearly always existed at the whim of the government. For some reason a naval capability has never been recognized as an essential component of the national fabric. It has been said, on several occasions, that Canada tends to think and act like a continental state rather than as a maritime state. Against such facts as the size of Canada's ocean domain, the economic dependence on seaborn exports and imports, the potential of offshore resources, and the role of shipping in the founding of this country, one might well wonder why governments seem to have this blinkered view of their country’s status in the world. Until that perspective changes, the RCN is going to remain well down the national priority list.

The actual strength of the RCN, or the acceptable maximum and minimum numbers of ships, has never been legislated. Rather, those levels have been the result of bargaining processes among the military leadership, bureaucrats and politicians. With each new shipbuilding program, a fleet structure and capability level was essentially agreed. The pre-training and manning of new ships was left to the RCN to manage. In some cases, such as the integrated modernization program for the Iroquois-class destroyers and the building of the 12 Canadian Patrol Frigates, not only was a new concept of operations embodied in the plan but so was a very complex training program to match sailors with new technologies. This could only be done through careful fleet management and temporary reductions in overall fleet capability – a case of a little short-term pain for long-term gain.

The NSPS plans to introduce three new types of warship into the Canadian fleet over some 30 years: (1) general-purpose surface combatants as replacements for all existing destroyers and frigates; (2) joint support ships to replace the obsolete fleet support ships; and (3) new Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships. The initial numbers of ships that the government planned to build indicate that the fleet structure of 2010 was thought adequate for the future: a flexible, combat-capable fleet able to undertake distant and home operations in more than one place at a time. The centrepiece of the fleet will continue to be the joint task force that has served Canada so well for the past two decades.

I agree that on first glance and applying a healthy inflation factor, it might seem that the amount of money allocated
in 2010/11 will not pay for the full number of ships in the NSPS. Maybe, but it is not only too early to tell but this view overlooks the fact that the cost per ship is not constant throughout the program. Follow-on ships are invariably less expensive than the lead ship. That certainly was the experience of the frigate program.

Getting from the fleet of 2010 to that of 2020/2025 was never going to be easy. Because NSPS has been late getting going, especially the new fleet support ships, gaps in fleet capability were inevitable. This is not a new situation for the RCN, it has often been required to improvise. This is the beauty of the NATO naval organization: a missing capability for an operation could easily come from another navy. For that matter, Canada often provided missing capabilities to NATO formations such as support ships and submarines. In the Pacific, parallel arrangements have existed with the Americans and from time to time the Australians and other countries.

The capability gaps caused by the demise of the Iroquois-class destroyers and the two fleet support ships is not the end of effective Canadian sea power. Far from it! The 12 frigates are still available as are the four submarines and the capability gaps caused by the present capability gaps is far from ideal, but it certainly doesn’t mean that the RCN is suddenly rendered impotent, only a fool would think that. Sixty-five years ago the RCN was able to keep three destroyers deployed to Korean waters for four years with only 11 destroyers in the fleet. Moreover, there was a major modernization program to implement and a NATO commitment to uphold. It’s all about good management and flexibility.

How could the dependence on other navies be lessened? First, it is not difficult to modify, on a temporary basis, a frigate so that it has the command and control capability necessary to lead a task group. Similarly, should the threat assessment dictate, it is not impossible to fit a local area-air defence system in a frigate. Other capabilities in that ship, such as the helicopter, may have to be sacrificed but if the aim is to create a balanced task force, then that is a small price to pay. Second, there are three possible solutions to the lack of fleet support capability.

- Build a commercial product tanker with minimum capacity to work in a task group. HMCS Provider was acquired in this manner in 1964 and took less than five years to build and deliver. In her case, the key was strictly controlled minimum navalization.
- Buy or long-lease a suitable product tanker and convert it to meet fleet support requirements. The Australians did this very successfully with HMAS Sirius for less than A$100 million in 2004.
- Lease a surplus fleet support ship from the Americans.

If the intention is to cover the deficiency as quickly as possible, then the second or third options are the logical solutions.

I am not qualified to judge whether the Canadian shipyards are able to meet the objectives of NSPS and so I will not comment on that issue but rather leave it to the experts in such matters, as I suggest the media do!

Finally, and by way of a conclusion, in Canada as in most liberal democracies the military is always under political control, and should remain that way. Without unlimited money, the determination of political priorities is not only the essence of politics today but also enormously difficult. In defence and security issues, the government has to assess the degree of added risk from delaying or cancelling a recommended project. It is then up to military leadership to make best use of the resources available and press the government for interim funds for improvisation and innovation. This is something the RCN has been very adept at doing over the years.

To bring this discussion back to bad fiction, it was indeed a dark and stormy night simply because some of those who comment on the early stages of a major naval program do not understand the complex political history of the RCN! Le plus ça change, le plus c’est la même chose! 🎩

Peter Haydon
Construction of the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS), also known as the *Harry DeWolf*-class, is scheduled to begin September 2015 at the newly refurbished Irving Shipbuilding yard in Halifax. With a delivery date of 2018 these vessels are expected to join the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) five years later than originally intended.

The AOPS have been subjected to sustained criticism since their announcement, much of which stems from the political origin of these vessels. During the 2005 federal election campaign the Conservative Party announced it would have three armed icebreakers built as the centrepiece of its Arctic policy, with the intention to project Canadian sovereignty into the Arctic. The RCN apparently balked at accepting icebreakers.1 When the Conservatives formed the government they made it clear that naval funding could be curtailed, and a compromise was reached – instead of icebreakers, offshore patrol vessels capable of operating in ice up to one metre thick were substituted. Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced the AOPS in 2007, allocating $3.1 billion to build the ships and setting aside an additional $4.3 billion to support the operation and maintenance of the ships over 25 years. Icebreaking capability was traded for increased numbers and flexibility to operate in non-Arctic waters so that the ship could play a three-ocean maritime control role in Canada’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs) – a role that the *Kingston*-class coastal defence vessels are unable to provide. The AOPS platform represents a more capable but less numerous replacement for the *Kingston*-class, satisfying the government pledge to ‘defend’ Arctic sovereignty and fitting into the overall naval recapitalization program.

The scaling down of the icebreakers to the less ice-capable AOPS design has led to the ships being criticized as “slush breakers” and “a dumb idea.” Ardent critics want to scrap the program entirely arguing that the design is too compromised, yielding too little icebreaking capability for Arctic operations and too slow a speed for a patrol vessel.2 Others argue that the AOPS is a step in the right direction in providing Canada with a three-ocean navy but that they are too lightly armed as a weapons platform, and incapable of war-fighting.3 The AOPS are indeed lightly armed, but the rationale is that the ships will not be primarily focused on fighting wars and breaking ice, but rather doing constabulary patrol work.

The thrust of this article is not the controversy surrounding the roles and capabilities of the AOPS but the negative effects of time and inflation on the AOPS program. A report issued late 2014 by the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) found that the AOPSs were not just behind schedule but already over budget. Instead of the six to eight ships originally intended, only four could possibly be afforded with the funding available.4 The increased price level for these ships is due to inflation, an economic term that simplifies reality by encompassing all the variables that lead to a general price increase. This includes everything from technical issues related to the design of the ships to increases in the wages of the shipyard workers. The longer a budget takes to be spent, the less that budget can buy.

In the case of AOPS, the impact of inflation can be combated in two general ways. The first way is to reduce the level of ambition of the vessels themselves, making them less capable and therefore cheaper. This has been done. For example, the top sustained cruising speed of the AOPS was reduced from an intended 20 to 17 knots.5 The other option to stay within budget is simply to decrease the number of ships delivered. This has also been done, with expected ship numbers officially being reduced to five or six ships. This article examines how delays in construction have hollowed out the budget to build the AOPS due to inflation, resulting in the expected delivery of fewer, less capable ships.
How Does Inflation Harm the AOPS Program?

The government of Canada currently increases the budget of the Department of National Defence (DND) by 2% per year to help offset the effects of inflation. This is roughly in line with the Consumer Price Index (CPI) which encompasses common expenses such as clothing and shelter. The problem, however, is that military hardware inflates at a higher rate than this. A 2006 RAND Corporation study, for example, found that warship costs have inflated at a rate of between 7 and 11% per annum on average over the last 50 years.6 This range has been accepted as appropriate to the Canadian context.

This article constructs three scenarios based on this range of inflation – the first scenario uses a 9% fixed inflator (see Table 1) and the second scenario uses a 7% fixed inflator (see Table 2). As the AOPS is primarily designed to fulfil a constabulary rather than a war-fighting role, armed with only a 25 mm cannon and a limited suite of sensors, I have ruled out the 11% rate of inflation that would be applied to complex warships. Available documentation does not make clear whether DND’s 2% annual funding increase applies to the AOPS budget, but I have applied it in the third scenario (see Table 3). Readers should note that the DND budget increase was 1.5% until FY 2011-12, when the government increased it to the current 2%. This number is supposed to jump to 3% during FY 2017-18. Although this is a seemingly small figure, this third adjusted scenario demonstrates the effects that these increases have on a 7% fixed inflator over time.

The Treasury Board’s Estimates give us intermittent glimpses of the AOPS program spending to the nearest dollar. The patrol ships first appeared in Supplementary Estimates (A) 2007-8, which committed $14.4 million (M) for the initial design work out of a total AOPS budget of $3.074 billion.7 Dividing the total budget by 6 yields an individual ship cost of $512.27M if the purchase order is 6 ships (remember that the price per unit goes up as the number of units goes down) and dividing it by 8 leads to a unit cost of $384.2M. These unit costs serve as a starting point for the inflation scenarios built around an initial estimate of 6 to 8 ships.

The Treasury Board Estimates for fiscal year (FY) 2008-9 did not mention the AOPS, but outside sources state that the delivery date of the ships was pushed back an additional year (to 2014) because of the substantial planning required to produce a vessel with the speed and seakeeping of a standard coastal patrol craft with an ice-strengthened hull shaped for operations in ice-covered waters. By FY 2010-11, the AOPS delivery date had been pushed back to 2016. AOPS appeared again in the 2011-12 Estimates, which committed another $14.54M to the program.8 By this time, AOPS was tied into the larger National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS). It was experiencing ongoing development troubles, and the delivery date for the first ship was pushed back until 2018.

By FY 2012-13, a new constraint on the AOPS program became apparent in the budget: docking infrastructure. Originally a separate program, the supporting infrastructure required at Esquimalt, Halifax and Nanisivik was now folded into the AOPS budget, reducing the funds available to build the ships themselves.9 Construction of the ships was scheduled to begin in 2015, with the initial delivery date of 2018 remaining the same. AOPS does not appear in the Estimates of FY 2014-15, so it appears that this remains the case.

Eight years of inflation give us a range of outcomes across the three scenarios, from the worst case scenario (using a 9% fixed inflator) of the budget being able to afford 4.4 to 3.3 ships (Table 1) to the best case inflation scenario of the $3.1 billion budget being able to afford 5.7 to 4.3 ships (Table 3). The 7% fixed inflator scenario yields between 5.0 to 3.7 ships (Table 2). To look at it from the opposite perspective, by how much would the original $3.1 billion budget need to be increased to afford the initial goal of between 6 and 8 ships? In the best case scenario the budget would have to be increased to a little over $4.3 billion to afford 6 to 8 ships in FY 2014-15. The worst case 9% fixed inflator scenario would require a budget of approximately $5.6 billion. The 7% fixed inflator would require a budget of over $4.9 billion to afford the desired number of ships, an increase of $1.8 billion above the original $3.1 billion budget. In this 7% inflation scenario, the original per unit cost of $512.27M and $384.20M for 6 and 8 ships respectively has increased to $822.59M and $616.94M, an increase of nearly 38% over the eight years in question.
### Table 1. Assuming 9% Inflation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>Unit Cost ($)</th>
<th># of Ships</th>
<th>Unit Cost ($)</th>
<th># of Ships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007-08 (original budget $3.1 billion)</td>
<td>512,270,000</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>384,200,000</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-09</td>
<td>558,370,000</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>418,780,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>608,620,000</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>456,470,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>663,400,000</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>497,550,000</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>723,110,000</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>542,330,000</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-13</td>
<td>788,190,000</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>591,140,000</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-14</td>
<td>859,120,000</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>644,340,000</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-15</td>
<td>936,440,000</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>702,330,000</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional funding</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4.7</td>
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</table>

### Table 2. Assuming 7% Inflation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
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<tr>
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<td>7.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010-11</td>
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<td>4.9</td>
<td>470,660,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-12</td>
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<td>503,610,000</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012-13</td>
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<td>4.3</td>
<td>538,860,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013-14</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
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<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-15</td>
<td>822,590,000</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>616,940,000</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional funding</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<td>5.4</td>
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### Table 3. Adjusted Inflation (Assuming 7% inflation minus annual DND funding increase)

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<tr>
<th>FY</th>
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<td>6.8</td>
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<td>2011-12</td>
<td>622,670,000</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>467,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012-13</td>
<td>653,800,000</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>490,350,000</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<td>686,490,000</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>514,860,000</td>
<td>6.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014-15</td>
<td>720,820,000</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>540,610,000</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional funding</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.2</td>
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New developments have to be factored into the calculations of the scenarios. Despite the budget crunch brought on by the ‘Great Recession’ in FY 2009-10 (with the effects reverberating through the defence budget since FY 2011-12), the government finalized the deal with Irving Shipbuilding and committed an additional $400 million to the $3.1 billion budgeted for the construction of the AOPS program at the start of 2015. The costs of the docking infrastructure program, however, must be subtracted from this figure. The PBO report pegged the cost at $274M but there is uncertainty about the actual cost of the program. Media reports have circulated a figure of $258 million for the deep water port at Nanisivik alone. Plans for Nanisivik have been scaled back to save money but still meet the government’s operational requirements. The current plans for Nanisivik are now reported to be $116M. The Estimates reveal that $29.87M was spent on docking infrastructure in FY 2012-13 and an additional $164.66M for docking infrastructure and further ship design in FY 2013-14. It is reasonable to deduce that the $116M for Nanisivik is embedded in this figure. Rounding the FY 2012-13 figure to $30M and adding it to the budget for Nanisivik yields a total of $146M. What seems like $400M in additional spending becomes $254M after the docking infrastructure program costs are subtracted. The funding scenarios suggest how many ships can be built as of the end of 2015. However, the first ship will not be delivered to the RCN until 2018. To see how many ships can be purchased by this time, the three scenarios can be projected forward three years using the revised numbers. Under the worst case scenario of 9% inflation, between 3.7 and 2.7 AOPS could be built, or half the numbers the government currently estimates it can afford (see Table 4, which continues from Table 1). The second scenario of 7% fixed inflation results in between 4.4 and 3.3 ships being constructed (see Table 5 which continues Table 2). The best case scenario (i.e., the one with the lowest inflator) suggests between 5.4 and 4.1 vessels could be constructed (see Table 6 which continues Table 3). These tables demonstrate how a small annual DND funding increase equates to a full ship over this period. The adjusted inflation rate of approximately 5% (see Table 6) is the most in line with current government estimates. Based on this rate, can 5 ships be delivered or 6? The answer is 5, and probably only 4 as things currently stand. However, it should be noted that the early government numbers were too optimistic. It is possible that further

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Table 4. Inflation Rate of 9% Projected to 2018</th>
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<td>FY</td>
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<td>2015-16</td>
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<td>2016-17</td>
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<td>2017-18</td>
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<tr>
<th>Table 5. Inflation Rate of 7% Projected to 2018</th>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
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<tr>
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<th>Table 6. Adjusted Rate Projected to 2018</th>
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revisions could be made to the AOPS program over the next years, which could result either in less ships delivered or additional funding committed to meet the current goal of 5 to 6 ships.

Several things can be said about the possibility of additional AOPS funding. First, the Harper government’s 2015 commitment of an additional $400 million in funding for the construction phase of the program, despite constraints on the federal and DND budgets, demonstrates the centrality of AOPS to the government’s Arctic policy. Construction of the vessels will begin in September, one month before the scheduled federal election. If the Conservatives remain in power, they may choose to allocate additional funds to support the program – a consideration that raises the question of path dependency. The AOPS is very much a signature Conservative program. Has the AOPS program progressed to the point that a Liberal or New Democratic government could not scale back or cancel it, robbing the Conservatives of a legacy?

Second, the decision to arrange the NSPS so that the AOPS are built before the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) Project, the backbone of the future RCN, may have a negative impact on the latter capital program. While an argument could be made that upfront costs (modernization of facilities) and lessons learned by Canada’s resurrected shipyards in building the AOPS first will go some way to alleviate the costs of the warships, the historical record provided by the RAND Corporation study suggests
that the general rate of inflation will continue regardless. Plus, the CSCs are true warships with complex systems which are prone to high rates of inflation. Delaying their construction will exacerbate the cumulative effects of inflation on the budget, necessitating additional funding or reduced numbers with reduced capabilities.

Third, all three inflation scenarios show that military inflation exceeds the growth rate of the Canadian economy, which grew on average by about 1.66% per year between 2007 and 2014.14 In the short term this problem is manageable through fixed funding increases or ad hoc injections of cash into stretched budgets. If this trend continues, however, the pressure on DND’s capital budget will become increasingly acute in delivering future military hardware, in particular ships like the Canadian Surface Combatant or the next generation fighter selected in the CF-18 Replacement Project. According to this logic, defence spending will have to take up a larger proportion of overall government spending to keep pace of inflation. From this standpoint, this case study of the AOPS budget and developments surrounding the program may serve as a harbinger of larger challenges to come.

Notes
* The author would like to thank Professor Anthony Sayers for his guidance in the genesis of this article as a course paper at the University of Calgary, as well as Professors Rob Huebert and Whitney Lackenbauer for their valuable comments and suggestions on various drafts.
6. This study found that the same ratio is applicable to military aircraft as well. Mark V. Arena, Irv Blickstein, Obaid Younossi and Clifford A. Grammic, “Why Has the Cost of Navy Ships Risen?” RAND Corporation, 18 July 2006.
12. David Pugliese, “Nanisivik Naval Facility was Originally Supposed to Cost $258 million but DND Balked at Price Tag,” Ottawa Citizen, 8 September 2014.

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A Failing Policy for Failed States: The EU and Maritime Migration out of Libya

Andrew Bergel and Michelle Legassick

Coverage of maritime migration out of Libya into the European Union (EU) has taken two distinct lines of discussion. First, it has been framed as a humanitarian crisis. Within the first 130 days of 2015, 1,800 migrants (that we know of) have lost their lives attempting to cross into Europe using maritime routes, making the Mediterranean crossing the most deadly sea crossing in the world. Its use by migrants, however, seems unlikely to decrease. Second, the increase in migrants crossing the Mediterranean has become a security crisis for the EU, as it has been unable to regulate the movement into the Schengen area. Furthermore, the steady stream of migrants making their way into the EU is straining the processing systems that many European countries have in place. In the case of Italy and Greece, which are receiving the bulk of irregular migrants, the strain is causing a crisis.

What roles can navies and coast guards play, and what political policies would be useful to help address this crisis? We will argue that both the humanitarian and the security crises the Mediterranean region is facing can be best addressed by forming a standing policy for working not only with developing and weak states, but failed states such as Libya on mitigating maritime migration.

Past Policies and Successes Addressing Irregular Migration by the EU

In the past, the EU has focused on increasing state capacity by bolstering resources and training security sector personnel in weak states that are being used as transit countries. By using 'security first' initiatives, the EU has focused on ensuring that the central governments of weak states have the capacity to secure their own territory. In the case of migrant flows to the EU, the failure of transit and source states to secure borders is a major obstacle to reducing the number of irregular migrants. After borders are secured, investment is then focused on development to address factors of insecurity that had resulted in the outflow of migrants in the first place.

The EU bases its model on the success of reducing the number of migrants using the western African maritime routes. The use of this route peaked in 2006 with 31,600 migrants crossing illegally from Senegal and Mauritania into the Canary Islands. However, the route has experienced a significant decrease in use, with only 275 migrants detected using this crossing in 2014. The decrease is credited to Spain establishing bilateral agreements with the departure countries of Senegal and Mauritania. These agreements placed a strong emphasis on border control, repatriation and the implementation of maritime surveillance on the coast by Senegal and Mauritania in return for investment by Spain.

The model used by Spain in western Africa has been partially recreated as the EU has attempted to stem the flow of migrants using the eastern Mediterranean route out of Turkey by land and sea crossings into Greece, Cyprus and southern Bulgaria. It is estimated that 50,830 migrants used the eastern Mediterranean route in 2014. In 2009, building upon Turkish efforts to accede into the EU, Turkey and EU authorities agreed to increase cooperation on curbing the flow of irregular migrants. In addition to initial technical and financial assistance, the EU has been working with Turkish authorities to bolster the capacity of Turkish border guards so migrants can be detained before they cross into the EU. Therefore, by
strengthening border monitoring and identifying and detaining migrants, the EU is trying to make entry into the Schengen area more difficult in the hope of discouraging future migrants. However, it has failed to institute a preventative program on the most active migration route – the central Mediterranean route that flows from North Africa to Europe – primarily from Libya into Italy. In 2014, 170,000 migrants used this route, which represents 60% of all irregular migration and illegal border crossing into the EU.4

While the current policy of the EU is to mitigate the flow of migration by preventing the outflow of migrants from the country of origin, this policy is hampered by porous borders that exist throughout many weak or failed states in Africa and the Middle East. Migrants originate from, and travel through, a wide range of developing, weak and failed states such as: Senegal, Nigeria, Mali and Ghana in western Africa; Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan in eastern Africa; and Syria and Afghanistan in the Middle East. Because there is no effective government with which to cooperate in a failed/failing state, it is difficult to stop the illegal migration at its source. This means that the EU response has been mainly reactive, using navy and coast guard forces to intercept and/or rescue migrants as they make the crossing. Migrants from all three of these regions are now converging on Libya as their final transit point for migration across the Mediterranean. This means that Libya – itself a failing/failed state – could be used as a bottleneck to slow down the flow of maritime migration to Europe.

Prevention and interception are effective policies when working with strong states – and sometimes even weak states that can be given sufficient incentive (as in the case of Senegal and Mauritania) – that can exert control of borders. But the EU needs to find a way to implement this policy even when the final departure country for migrants is a failed state. In other words, instead of reacting with the use of maritime forces, the EU needs to find a policy that is more proactive. As a central clearinghouse for maritime migrants, Libya looks like a good place to start.

**Current Responses to the Central Mediterranean Route**

Irregular migration flows into central Mediterranean European states have increased at a staggering rate. In 2014, there was a 310% increase in migration on this route and 2015 looks like it will outpace both 2014 flows and casualties.5 The EU has attempted to adopt a new batch of remedies to address the humanitarian crisis in the central Mediterranean, pushed in a large part by media coverage and international criticism over perceived inaction following the high death tolls in early 2015. Thus far, the EU has expanded the scope and funding of the Frontex-run *Operation Triton*, a multinational border enforcement
operation in the Mediterranean. Frontex operates as the primary EU-wide organization that manages the security of external borders and cooperation among member states agencies. As well, the EU has also come up an agreement to resettle to other EU countries 60,000 asylum seekers that have reached southern Europe, although it seems unlikely that this will be implemented.

Operation Triton replaced Italy’s search and rescue mission Operation Mare Nostrum in November 2014.7 Mare Nostrum was launched by the Italian government in October 2013 following the drowning of 300 migrants off the island of Lampedusa. With a budget of nine million Euros per month and a mandate of patrolling the international waters between Italy and North Africa, the operation is credited with saving the lives of 140,000 migrants.

Despite its success at saving lives, the program was politically unpopular and expensive for Italy to continue without increased support from other EU countries, which wasn’t forthcoming. While Triton has continued to retrieve migrant vessels in distress, the operation is only active within 30 nautical miles of the Italian coast. Not only does this emphasize its primary focus of border security, it undoubtedly means that the number of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean will increase as the operation is not actively searching for vessels in distress.

In June 2015, the EU launched the European Union Naval Forces operation in the Southern Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), a mission designed to disrupt the trafficking networks by identifying, seizing and destroying the vessels that are used by smugglers. While based on the successful techniques that aided in the disruption of piracy by the EU’s Operation Atalanta, the destruction of ships will probably not have significant impact on the movement of migrants for several reasons. First, the operation would have to target the migrant vessels while empty, which can only be accomplished by destroying them while they are still in Libya, raising a variety of legal hurdles that will slow the process significantly. Second, the vessels used by migrants are relatively cheap and easy to acquire, and traffickers do not expect these vessels to return once they leave Libya – either the ships will be intercepted en route or they will fail to make the voyage across the Mediterranean. The loss or destruction of the vessels is thus already factored into the cost of the operation.

In April 2015 the “Joint Foreign and Home Affairs Council: Ten Point Action Plan on Migration” was released to provide more details on the plan to address the migrant crisis. It is a response by the Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs that establishes a short-term action plan for the EU. The plan centres on: increasing joint operations in the Mediterranean through better funding and expansion of Frontex’s operational area; capture and destruction of smuggling vessels; better agency integration in tracing smuggler financing; joint asylum processing in Italy and Greece led by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO); EU-wide fingerprinting for migrants; emergency relocation mechanisms; EU voluntary resettlement projects; rapid return program from frontline EU member states led by Frontex; increased coordination with states surrounding Libya; and deployment of immigration officers in key origin countries to track flows.

The first eight of these responses focus on prescriptive migration policies, while only the last two build upon the preventative policies that had met with success in West Africa. And none of these policies focus on directly dealing with failed states, in this case Libya, that act as the primary departure point for migration into southern Europe. These 10 action points will also require EU-wide member state funding that could encounter delay and/or pushback due to tight fiscal situations plaguing many governments.

The domestic political viability of these recommendations is also in question. While most member states have been receptive to expanded maritime patrols in the Mediterranean and the adoption of better technology and information-sharing rules, they have not been as receptive to policies that safeguard the rights of migrants. Differing attitudes among EU members toward the rights of migrants have been exacerbated by recent gains by nationalist/anti-immigrant parties and increased fear over the return of Islamic extremists to Europe after time
spent fighting in conflicts in the Middle East or North Africa. Such issues could delay new initiatives designed as a series of time-sensitive prescriptive measures to address increasing stress on the current system. Consequently, the action plan could well be rendered impotent, given the slow pace of implementation and rapidly changing events on the ground and sea.

These EU action points are in accordance with Article 98 of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Seas (UNCLOS), which requires assistance to be rendered to individuals/ships in distress. However, there are some problems with the list, and the implications for success. The actions only address the humanitarian aspect of the migration crisis when migrants are in danger. Given that many irregular migrants are traveling across the Mediterranean Sea on vessels that are overcrowded and unseaworthy, there is a high likelihood that these vessels will issue distress calls, as their vessels cannot handle the voyage. Thus, the EU is adhering to the letter of international law under UNCLOS but, in doing so, it has reinforced policy approaches that stress prescriptive rather than preventative measures.

Longer term prescriptive measures, as outlined in the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), have been slow to mature. In development since 1999, the EU-wide CEAS platform was finally approved in June 2013 and has yet to be fully implemented. This new system would help standardize processing and approval of asylum seekers, address vulnerable individuals and unaccompanied minors, and prioritize transfer of applicants away from member states with checkered pasts regarding the treatment of those seeking entry. In addition to the long process of design and approval of the CEAS, critics note that implementation and enforcement in the 28 member states will be a challenge, and the legal framework lacks clarity and gives too much discretion to member states. Furthermore, CEAS will encounter fiscal and political pushback as did the 10 point action plan.

Similar to remedy packages following the 2008 financial crisis and the recent Greek crisis, migration has become another source of friction between the supranational structure of the EU and its sovereign member states. Indeed, making decisions about migration is an important element of sovereignty so it’s not surprising that governments are unwilling to cede much ground. If a more holistic coordinated policy is not implemented, state-driven economic and security issues could further balkanize member state responses, especially given the frontline effect endured by southern and eastern Mediterranean states, such as Greece, Italy and Spain – all of which are also under economic stress. Likewise, the role that states in northern and western Europe play on the back end for resettlement and integration (Germany, France and Sweden are the most accepting) could also come into question. If the political paradigm continues to move toward more nationalist anti-immigration policies, Europe’s southern states would not only bear frontline responsibility for security, processing and rapid return, but an increasing percentage of resettlement as well.

Given the popular response to the huge number of deaths of migrants in the Mediterranean thus far in 2015 on the one hand, and yet the unwillingness to pay for a solution to resolve the crisis (via support for coast guard and naval forces) and the increasing reluctance of EU states to accept migrants on the other hand, there has to be another option. The only way to reduce the danger to the migrants themselves and decrease number of migrants...
reaching the EU is by preventing the departure of these vessels and/or facilitating their interception within the domestic waters of the departure state.

**Policy Recommendations for Engaging Libya**

With the largest maritime migration flows into the EU coming out of Libya across the Mediterranean, it is critical to engage this state to reduce the flow. However, Libya is currently embroiled in conflict and is not focused on its border security. While formal European policy is to encourage the Libyan parties to agree to a Government of National Unity, and offer support to that future government, this is a long-term goal, leaving the EU weak on short- to medium-term solutions to the migration crisis. In order for the EU to facilitate the best practice model used in Senegal, Mauritania and Turkey, it must engage with actors within Libya that could potentially address the country’s porous borders.

Currently, local coast guards are the only actors that are actively intercepting migrant vessels and returning them to Libya before they pass into international waters. While corruption is a major problem in the coast guard, as are the Libyan detention centres that house intercepted migrants, these actors are still providing services that could be bolstered to slow down the flow of migration. Given the conflict in Libya, it is no surprise that the coast guard and detention centres are underfunded, and lacking the resources necessary to monitor the maritime border in a holistic fashion.

Rather than using EU naval forces, the EU could contribute to the training of Libyan forces – and in this way kill several birds with one stone. It could save money as training is less expensive than having EU maritime forces patrol/monitor the Mediterranean for migrants. As well, it would build government capacity in Libya and hopefully move the state beyond its domestic conflict. It could also build useful relations with Libyan actors who could be helpful in the future if/when Libya sorts out its mess. However, if the EU were to fund the Libyan coast guard and detention centres, it would need to ensure that the human rights and security of migrants were protected. Furthermore, the EU would also have to track any investment to ensure that the funds are not siphoned away from migration control through corruption or support for one side in the conflict. To ensure that obligations are carried out, the EU would need to involve Libya’s two competing governments led by Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni and Prime Minister Omar al-Hassi, based in Tobruk and Tripoli respectively.

The presence of competing governments complicates the political landscape for external actors, but it also theoretically provides parties that can be encouraged to secure Libya’s maritime borders. While the frontlines of confrontation between the armed factions for control of Benghazi, western Libya, the Sidra oil basin and Ubari in the south are likely to be insecure in the immediate future, a significant portion of the Libyan state is not actively engaged in the armed conflict as it is already within the control of either al-Thinni in the northeast or al-Hassi in the northwest. Since the north of the country is the area that borders the Mediterranean, this is helpful to EU plans. The political control has become consolidated within these regions and these are areas where there is some form of order and authority. While al-Thinni and al-Hassi do not directly control all the actors within their respective territories, sub-state groups have stated their allegiance (at least in the short term) to their region’s leader.

![Migrants are taken to the mainland after being rescued by the Italian Navy September 2014.](image)
Both al-Thinni and al-Hassi have worked to establish governments within the territory they control, and have made significant steps to demonstrate their capacity to lead in order to gain international recognition and legitimacy. The EU could work with al-Thinni and al-Hassi in their respective territories to stem the flow of irregular migrants out of Libya, while continuing to encourage a Government of National Unity. The buy-in of both Prime Ministers would be critical, as any resources provided to the coastguard outposts on the Libyan coast could be diverted to the conflict.

Assuming that agreement could be reached with both groups in Libya, then work will have to begin on relations with the Libyan coastguard(s). There is virtually no Libyan Navy as most of the Libyan naval fleet was destroyed in 2011, leaving the 1800 km coastline vulnerable. It may be that building a Libyan Navy will occur in the future, but for now the focus will be on the coast guard. There are about a dozen 12-metre inflatable patrol boats being used by the coast guard. Officers have complained that these crafts are not large or fast enough to respond to an emergency, and the vessels were not intended for use in open waters. These vessels are spread across coast guard posts in the northeast and northwest. However, these posts do not communicate with each other as they are located in the territories of rival governments, meaning that there is no coordination.

Not only is the coast guard in need of vessels, it also lacks the equipment necessary to conduct its operations such as lifejackets, night vision goggles and weapons to protect members against migrant traffickers. The problem that the EU must solve before equipping the coast guard is how to stop these resources from being sold by officers who are not receiving steady pay, or being seized and used in the conflict to tip the balance in favour of either one of the Prime Ministers. However, since much of the conflict is not along the coast, it is unlikely that lifejackets, boats and vessel training would change the balance of the civil war.

While supporting nascent coast guards in a country with two competing governments may seem like a rather byzantine endeavour, there may be an opportunity for the EU to use the competition between these two governments to its advantage. By creating a monitoring system for migrant vessel point of origin along the Libyan coast, Brussels could offer increased resources to whichever government is seen as better addressing EU goals. Given that both Al-Thinni and Al-Hassi governments are desperate for material and financial support, the two may well compete for these additional resources by focusing on the outward migration flow. Indeed, the EU could designate some of the financial incentives/resources toward joint efforts and operations by both governments.

If the EU could gain buy-in by both the Al-Thinni and Al-Hassi regimes, at least in the realm of maritime enforcement, it would work toward Brussel’s overall goal of expediting positive interaction between the two rival factions. And here we might finally stumble upon at least one building block for a national unity government in Libya.

Notes
Reflections on Canada, the State, the Nation and the Navy

Marc Milner

In the classic model of seapower the navy and the nation are fused into some single organic being. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, the most famous proponent of this concept, summarized this notion at the end of the 19th century as ‘navy, colonies and trade.’ The model works something like this: trading nations need access to the sea and markets and must have a merchant fleet to carry that trade; colonies provide markets, bases and resources; and navies protect it all.

Mahan laid this out in his 1890 classic The Influence of Seapower upon History 1660-1783, which was immediately translated into various languages and issued to naval officers as their primer. It has proven to be a remarkably durable concept of how seapower ought to work.

Certainly the development of a fully integrated national maritime policy that includes shipbuilding, trade and a strong navy has long been the benchmark against which Canada’s experience of seapower has been measured.

Canada remains highly dependent upon overseas markets (about 80% of Canada’s trade travels by sea), and is girded by three oceans and has the longest coastline in the world, but we have no Mahanist vision of our maritime role and even our naval policy is episodic. In that sense, it might be argued that Canada has not yet created the ‘correct’ relationship between the state and the navy – or even between the nation and the navy. And we do occasionally beat ourselves up over this apparent ‘failure.’

But the truth may be that we have been reading the wrong history. As heretical as it may seem, the experience that Canada needs to study is not that of Great Britain (which influenced Mahan’s ideas) but that of France – the other great seapower of the Age of Sail. In contrast to Britain, where seapower (especially after the execution of Charles I in 1649) was an expression of national will through the instrument of Parliament and the interests of the monied classes, French seapower was both widely regionalized – along the Biscay, or La Manche, or the Mediterranean coast – and remote from the seat of political power. The French capital was far removed from the coasts and from the country’s maritime economy. In absolutist France the exercise of seapower depended on the whim of the King and the personal strength of his Ministers.

A few examples illustrate the point nicely. The powerful French fleet which challenged both the English and the Dutch for maritime supremacy between 1660 and 1700 was built by one man, Jean Baptiste Colbert. He was Minister of just about everything: Controller General of Louis XIV’s finances; Minister of Commerce; Minister of Colonies; and Secretary of the Navy. Colbert believed in the fundamentals of mercantilism, in strong colonies, trade and a navy, and so he built an enormous fleet. But he also knew he had to institutionalize seapower if his navy was to survive him. This he failed to do, despite attempts to reform France’s system of trade and industry. Colbert died in 1683 and his fleet was largely destroyed in King William’s War from 1692 to 1700.

In the absence of Colbert’s vision, the French navy reverted to its role as simply a weapon in the King’s arsenal, and a reflection of the power and prestige of the French monarchy. The situation for the navy – as distinct from local squadrons of privateers raised by the regional admiralties – was always precarious. France was primarily a continental power, with a strong national bias for the army, which was thought to be the only real guarantor of the state from both internal and external threats. And since seapower requires deep pockets, it was always hard for the state to sustain the navy in times of protracted war or extended peace.
Throughout the 18th century France remained a great maritime commercial state largely by inertia. With a vast and accessible coastline, a huge number of Frenchmen followed the sea and made trade connections around the world. Indeed, in the late 18th century France had the largest fishing fleet in the world and was the greatest supplier of sugar in Europe from its colonies in the Caribbean. Although naval historians make fighting France at sea look easy – usually by compressing a decade or so of war into a single decisive naval battle – reducing France to a point of vulnerability was an enormous challenge for the British, and it was not always possible to do so.

When Étienne François, duc de Choiseul, became Minister of everything between 1761 and 1770 – especially Minister of War and Secretary of the Navy – the French navy prospered again. It was Choiseul's navy, and the astute guidance of French diplomacy, that settled the issue of American independence by 1783. The greatest naval battle of that conflict, the Battle of the Chesapeake in 1781, was tactically indecisive but very decisive strategically. This was, in many ways, the French way: seapower was a means to an end, not an end in itself. And rather typically, Choiseul's fleet scarcely outlasted him, and was utterly undone by neglect and then revolution in the decades that followed.

The boom-and-bust cycle of French naval building in the Age of Sail and the precarious relationship between the French state and its navy may inform us better about our own circumstances than anything in British maritime history of that era. Like Paris, Ottawa lies inland and is remote from Canada's three coasts. If you ever wonder about how remote most Canadians are from the sea, you need only consider the endless debate in Parliament over search and rescue aircraft, the need for long-range, all-weather helicopters, and the positioning of search and rescue resources along the coasts (or in the north). Such debate would never be as prolonged or as apparently futile if most Canadians could not solve their emergency problems simply by dialing 911. The essential fact is that Canada is not a maritime nation, it is a continental one: the bulk of the people, power and politicians live inland. For them water is a barrier, something to get over to get where you need to go. Moreover, the military tradition formed by the colonists of what is now Canada was continental. Like France, most of what Canada did was fight battles on the land frontiers of the country. The armouries scattered in towns and villages across Canada are silent testimony to that tradition.

There have been moments, nonetheless, when Canada verged on being a maritime state. The first was in the 1870s, when the young Dominion was a great maritime power, with pioneering and innovative steam auxiliary and sailing fleets operating from both the St. Lawrence system and the Maritimes. During the 1878 Russian war scare, when the British Admiralty informed Canada that no cruisers could be spared to defend shipping in Canadian waters, the new Dominion set out to build its own navy. The British Admiralty concluded that the Canadian navy, based on turning Canadian vessels into auxiliary warships, "would exceed in number and speed any force a European power at war with England could readily acquire on the Atlantic seaboard." The plan for a Dominion navy, built around Charybdis, a cruiser loaned to Canada by the Royal Navy, came to naught in 1882 but the reluctance of the Imperial government to defend Canadian waters and the size of Canada's merchant fleet represented a tantalizing moment in naval history.

That moment passed, and Canada threw itself into continental development. Instead of modernizing its shipbuilding industry and making the transition from sail to steam, it built railways and settled the prairies. The Canadian shipbuilding industry was moribund by 1900 and Britain was even less eager to help with maritime problems.

Although there was momentary unanimity in Parliament when George Foster brought forward his motion in March 1909 to establish a Canadian navy, there was no subsequent agreement on why a navy was needed. This issue remains unclear for Canadians even today. After all, as Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier rather smugly informed the 1897 Colonial Conference, Canada has no defence problems. The Daily Star of Montreal captured the public mood in 1906 when it commented – prophetically – that the withdrawal of the British forces from Canada did not matter because Canada was protected by the US Navy. Small wonder that Admiral Jackie Fisher, later First Sea Lord, muttered just after the turn of the century that Canadians were "an unpatriotic and grasping people who stick to us only for the good they can get from us … we ought to do nothing whatsoever for them.”*
The catalyst for Foster’s proposal to Parliament that Canada build its own navy, and for unanimous support for his motion, was the pace of German naval building, which had just been revealed. Fear gripped the Empire. Prime Minister Laurier, who originally wanted simply a militarized Fisheries Protection Service, seized the moment and proposed a proper navy as both an instrument of state power and as an engine of industrial growth, primarily in Quebec where his support was waning.

Curiously, historians have dwelt upon the details of Laurier’s plan for a local squadron, but not his attempt to build a national naval service and all that that implied. His final scheme, which added one Boadicea-class cruiser to the mix, would have required about 2,600 sea-going personnel, plus dockyard establishments, training support, a naval college, and headquarters and command personnel: in total nearly 4,000 regular force personnel and a budget of $3 million. This would have made the RCN larger than the regular Canadian army, which numbered some 3,000 officers and men. In short, what Laurier proposed in 1910 was a navy big enough to be autonomous and an ambitious re-orientation of Canada’s defence policy.

Laurier also saw the navy as an engine to drive Canada’s moribund shipbuilding industry. Shortly after the Naval Act was passed in 1910 he convinced Vickers of Britain, one of the great armament manufacturers, to establish a shipyard at Maisonneuve, on Montreal Island, to build the new navy. Canadian Vickers opened in 1911, and played a key role in Canadian naval construction for the next 60 years. However, Anglo-Canadians in Ontario saw this as little more than a political boondoggle that would benefit Quebec. So Canadian naval procurement was shaped by politics from the outset, and Laurier’s scheme illustrates the abiding and central role of Quebec – curiously enough – in the fortunes of the Canadian navy during its first century.
Canadians voted in a general election in 1911, an election in which naval policy played a key role for the only time in Canadian history. Laurier lost and Parliament decided it did not want his navy. As a result, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) was virtually stillborn and by the time war broke out in Europe in 1914 Canada’s navy was moribund. That left only one option when war came in 1914: throw the weight of Canada’s continental military tradition – its soldiers and youth – onto the Western Front. The British consoled Canadians with the knowledge that if a maritime threat developed, the Imperial fleet would safeguard Canada’s shoreline. When the U-boats finally arrived on the coast in 1917 it was undefended and the British were too busy to send help. Canadian politicians noticed. In fact they noticed two things: the murderous campaign on the Western Front which drove Canada to the brink of civil war in 1917; and the failure of the mother country to help in a time of naval need.

It fell to William Lyon Mackenzie King – the Prime Minister who Canadian military historians love to hate – to build the first real Canadian fleet. Canadian naval historians might want to venerate him as our equivalent of Colbert! In fact, Mackenzie King was unquestionably the father of the modern RCN. In the interwar years he built a fleet in a way no one has been able to do before or since: he bought it, offshore, with cash. In 1927 King’s government ordered the construction of the destroyers Saguenay and Skeena from British yards: the first modern warships built for the RCN. When King returned to power after 1935 he bought a half flotilla of C-class destroyers from the British. By 1939 the RCN had a respectable little fleet of seven modern destroyers. This was not an expression of national will but an attempt by King to create alternative modes of response to the looming crisis in Europe. No one wanted a repeat of the casualties of 1914-1918 and the conscription crisis of 1917.

King even accepted – tentatively to be sure – ambitious plans for massive naval expansion on the eve of war. His January 1939 naval scheme called for the acquisition of nine large and powerful Tribal-class destroyers, 18 motor-torpedo boats, a small squadron of minesweepers, two depot ships and two secondary bases for the fleet. This, plus the seven River-class destroyers already acquired would have pushed the RCN from 1,800 all ranks to over 6,000. As with Laurier’s 1910 plans, this would have made the RCN Canada’s largest armed service. This expansion program formed the basis of fleet development in the Second World War, which in turn founded the modern Canadian navy.

Leonard Murray, Director of Naval Operations and Plans in 1939, later recalled that the only limit to fleet expansion during the winter of 1939-40 was whether all the money allocated could be spent in that fiscal year. The constraints on naval expansion at this time were therefore structural and industrial, and the government worked hard over the next few years to overcome these constraints. By 1945 shipbuilding was Canada’s second largest industry – most of it concentrated along the lower St. Lawrence River – and Canada had built the fifth largest navy in the world.

It is clear that King hoped that a large navy would help deflect pressure to put the army into the field, and keep Canadians content about their war effort (he did the same with the air force by signing the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan agreement in 1939). It did not work. The navy did yeoman work in the North Atlantic but Canadians failed to identify with it. Moreover, the RCN was unable to defend the Gulf of St. Lawrence against U-boat attacks in the summer of 1942, and the resulting furor in Parliament hit King’s government hard. The navy needed to be successful and it needed to be seen taking the war to the enemy. In 1942-43 it could do neither. King was forced to commit troops to the invasion of Sicily to placate an angry electorate, and eventually the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral Percy W. Nelles was sacked. The myth and legacy of the Canadian Corps during the Great War was too much to overcome. Canada was a continental nation, and its military tradition revealed that. The navy was a creation of the state, not a manifestation of national will (and so it remains).

Among the legacies of the war effort was the Canadian maritime policy announced in 1944. This was a real attempt to build a lasting integrated maritime policy on the strength of wartime developments in shipbuilding, including a Canadian deep-sea merchant navy and a large
and capable navy. The Canadian merchant fleet, however, was excluded from much of the post-war redevelopment trade in Europe, costly to operate and riven by labour unrest. The government sold it off to Britain in 1947. Shipbuilding and the navy were saved by the Cold War which thrust Canada back into a naval role building escorts and anti-submarine vessels in anticipation of WW III. A large, modern fleet – by 1960 about 100 ships of various types, including an aircraft carrier – was built in widely dispersed yards (although concentrated along the lower St. Lawrence) both to maintain capacity but also to ensure that it was dispersed under the new threat of nuclear war.3

But the maritime policy gradually faded until it was finally killed in the early 1960s by the advent of thermo-nuclear war and changing social conditions at home. A decade after the navy’s 50th anniversary it was down to a core of 24 St. Laurent-type frigates in desperate need of modernization, four new DDH 280 destroyers, three submarines and three supply ships (AORs).

It would be great to say that the naval renaissance which delivered the current fleet of Canadian Patrol Frigates in the 1990s was the result of a groundswell of national sentiment, or the result of consistent pressure from Members of Parliament to keep the navy modern and capable. But there is no evidence of that. Most Canadians – then as now – have never even seen their fleet. The reasons for building the Canadian Patrol Frigates were entirely related to industrial, political and foreign policy calculations. It was thus a rational decision made by the state to build a modern fleet. And the government – like the monarchs of 18th-century France – built it as an instrument of statecraft.

In the end it would seem that the way Canada makes naval policy, builds fleets and the relationship among the navy, the people and the state is pretty much normal (although Canada seems to be uniquely bad at procurement). Navies are expensive to build and maintain, they require long lead times, they require enormous political capital, they have tremendous political ramifications, and the struggle to build and sustain them is never-ending. In that sense, uncertainty has always been a central feature of fleet planning. The navy’s key battleground has always been Ottawa, and it neglects the politics of procurement at its peril. As the French navy knew only too well, if you want to build a fleet you need to have the ear of the King.3

Notes

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Located along the south banks of English Bay, Vancouver, far from the city’s urban core, it can be easy for non-marians to overlook the Jericho Sailing Centre Association (JSCA) and its longstanding influence across the Lower Mainland’s extended boating community. But to do so would also be to overlook an enduring model of inclusiveness and collaboration within western Canada’s network of maritime search and rescue (SAR) responders. Protecting the recreational users of English Bay waters for close to 40 years, Jericho Rescue prides itself on contributing an essential safety net for water enthusiasts. Especially now, given recent nation-wide reductions in federally funded Canadian Coast Guard services, Vancouverites can still have peace of mind when boating or participating in other on-water activities.

While in no way would Jericho Rescue claim to have the capacity to replicate or replace the exceptional operations of the Coast Guard, Vancouver Police Department (VPD) Marine Unit, or Royal Canadian Marine Search and Rescue (RCM-SAR), Jericho’s volunteer rescue program provides a meaningful presence and measurable impact throughout the approaches to Vancouver’s Burrard Inlet.

How did it all begin? Situated along the shores of what is now Jericho Beach Park, the structure in which JSCA currently resides once served as the Marine and Stores building for the RCAF’s Jericho Beach Air Station. A flying boat centre first established in 1920, it became western Canada’s largest military base until it was decommissioned and turned over to the City of Vancouver in 1969 for re-designation as parkland. In 1974, keen dinghy sailors with a unique vision formed the Jericho Sailing Centre Association and were granted a license by Vancouver Board of Parks and Recreation to occupy 4.5 acres of waterfront land provided they restored the decrepit, condemned Department of National Defence Building 13. This was done, and JSCA has been there ever since. From the beginning, JSCA has provided low-cost facilities for small naturally powered watercraft (sailing dinghies,
windsurfers, kayaks, canoes, outriggers, row boats, stand-up paddle boards).

The not-for-profit, non-taxpayer funded, ocean recreation centre is believed to be the largest organization of its kind in the world. Supported by 700 avid enthusiasts at the time of its inception, JSCA now boasts an annual membership base of over 3,000 households. Almost 500,000 boat launches occur at the recreation centre in a season, undertaken by more than 30,000 people. JSCA schools and affiliated clubs introduce as many as 9,000 people to ocean recreation each year. It is home to the largest windsurfing school in Canada, the largest Sea Scout troop in the world and a sailing program for disabled water enthusiasts that was created and developed by Vancouver’s former Mayor, Sam Sullivan. JSCA hosts more than 80 on-water event days each year, with some competitive events including as many as 3,500 participants.

**Role and Resources**

Unchanged since the founding years, Jericho Rescue’s primary function is to protect and serve JSCA members and other users of the Jericho Sailing Centre. Whether winds act up and a novice windsurfer finds himself/herself overwhelmed, or a late-afternoon sailor is caught adrift on an outbound current after thermal winds have died off for the night, Jericho Rescue’s objective is to ensure every Jericho member and guest makes it safely back to shore. Education, of course, is often the key to prevention. Marine education, safety and comprehensive emergency preparedness are critical necessities for any player operating in an active port. Therefore, at the start of each season, Jericho Rescue encourages its members and the general public to attend the English Bay Safety Seminar as a means to promote better ocean recreation practices. Whether commercial, naval, or recreational in nature, big ports see big traffic on the water. Right from the start, ocean safety has served as a cornerstone of JSCA’s constitutional mission – and ‘Members Helping Members’ has always been its driving motto. JSCA stakeholders wanted to ensure that there were resources available to help members and other users in need, and to make certain the centre’s activities were not a liability for local professional emergency responders.

Even with preparation and marine safety education, accidents happen and unexpected emergencies arise. Given the rescue team’s consistent presence on English Bay waters, it has become regular practice for Jericho Rescue to serve as the ‘vessel of opportunity’ for distress calls involving members of the public on the water throughout Vancouver’s harbour approaches. In 2014, alone, Jericho Rescue recorded a total of 239 mariner rescues in its operational logs – both of JSCA members and the general public. Many more boating enthusiasts were assisted through simple on-water instruction of self-rescue techniques.

Developed and refined over four decades, the Jericho Rescue program has become a model for grassroots, community-based, marine safety volunteerism. In the earliest years, Jericho Rescue worked with a single rigid-hull inflatable Bombard 18’ and relied on the good intentions and safety skills (which were not standardized) of willing volunteers recruited from within the active membership base. Since then, however, Jericho Rescue has evolved into a much more formalized program. Administered by a staff coordinator and governed by a Safety Committee of the Board, Jericho’s team of 40 well-trained member-volunteers record an average of 3,000 engine hours each year, ensuring that at least one vessel in Jericho’s rescue fleet is on water-ready stand-by during even the coldest winter months when recreational boating is at a low point. These rescue volunteers now undergo a rigorous training and certification program designed with the best practices in boat handling (Pleasure Craft Operator Certificate (PCOC)), VHF radio protocols, first responder medical aid (OFA1), and marine emergency preparedness in mind. Team members are also provided regular orientation on vessel maintenance, on-water needs, recreational ocean craft vulnerabilities, commercial shipping operations, changing sea-state conditions and local-area marine hazards.

**JSCA Rescue recruits receive a fleet orientation during spring training, 26 April 2014.**
Jericho Rescue’s fleet has also expanded over the years, and now consists of a Titan 200, Zodiac Hurricane 590, and an aluminum 20’ modified Jericho Marks workboat outfitted for rescue, mark setting and light towing. The Jericho Rescue team was fortunate to receive a $100,000 provincial grant in 2013 to assist in the replacement of the Jericho Marks boat, and to provide much-needed additional funding for the acquisition of the Titan 200. This grant illustrates that provincial authorities recognize the important role Jericho Rescue currently serves in safeguarding its own members, as well as other recreational boaters on English Bay waters, given the federal closure of the Kitsilano Canadian Coast Guard Station in 2013.

**Working with Professional Emergency Responders**

With more than 200 marine incidents logged on average each year, Jericho Rescue has come to be recognized for its efforts by both the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) and Vancouver Police Department (VPD) Marine Unit. The Jericho Rescue Team works closely with the Coast Guard, Port Metro Vancouver, VPD Marine Unit, Vancouver Beach Lifeguards, and other agencies that all have an interest in supporting public safety on local waters. In 2011, Jericho Rescue was the recipient of the Royal Life-savers Society Canada (BC and Yukon Chapter) award in commendation of services rendered.

In no way, of course, does Jericho Rescue match the operations of the CCG, VPD Marine Unit or RCM-SAR. All three organizations acknowledge, however, that Jericho Rescue helps to mitigate a large percentage of minor on-water mishaps throughout English Bay each season. By helping to ensure that small problems remain small, Jericho’s Rescue Team enables more sophisticated and costly life-saving resources to focus on truly urgent emergencies as they arise. This happy arrangement was never part of the original design but it has become an important part of the Jericho Rescue legacy.

Bulk transportation and commercial shipping are an integral part of the West Coast economy. Port Metro Vancouver transits $187 billion in goods each year, and shipping traffic is growing. Commercial anchorage in English Bay increased from 15 to 18 designated moorage locations in the last two years. The density of traffic on the water is significant now and noticeable to all recreational boaters. JSCA hosts many regattas and special events throughout the summer season. Much of this activity occurs amidst the 10 southernmost, densely configured anchorage locations in the bay. It has always been standard procedure for...
Jericho management to inform Port Metro Vancouver of any large-scale on-water activities hosted by the organization. As a response to the growing congestion of commercial harbour traffic, Jericho Rescue’s recruits have now been instructed to communicate directly with transiting harbour pilots on VHF Channel 12 when circumstances call for a clarification of intentions among multiple vessels.

The rescue personnel continually track when commercial ships are gliding into anchorage positions, and work to ensure recreational boaters are providing adequate room. In many instances, JSCA Rescue’s warnings are to boaters who are not part of its member population. As just one recent log entry example from June 2015 illustrates, Jericho Rescue took the initiative to retrieve and relocate a non-JSCA kite-surfer who had ditched in heavy winds, was unable to regain flight, and was floating directly in line with a transiting ship looking to anchor. JSCA Rescue informed the pilot of its intentions to rescue the individual so as to keep the shipping lane clear. All parties were kept regularly informed of developments, the rescue was expeditious and all indications suggested that the commercial harbour pilot genuinely appreciated both the rescue effort and the regular communication updates throughout the episode. There was a respectful spirit of collaboration among all parties. This example of open and proactive communication between commercial shipping and recreational boaters represents a significant advance in multi-stakeholder collaboration over four full decades of shared harbour use.

That Jericho Rescue was invited to join the Marine Emergency Response Coordination Committee (MERCC) in 2014 provides the greatest indication of the role it has come to play in the marine community as a grassroots, but highly visible, volunteer rescue operation. MERCC members now include the Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Coast Guard, RCM-SAR, RCMP, VPD, Vancouver Fire and Rescue Services, E-Comm 9-1-1, BC Emergency Health Services, Canada Border Services Agency, CERES Corp, and other related agencies, as well as Port Metro Vancouver. The committee receives additional support from private sector stakeholders such as Harbour Air, Seaspan and the Western Canadian Marine Response Corporation.

MERCC meets every three months to discuss new operational hazards and protocols, revised best practices in the field and to solicit input about improvements to large-scale emergency preparedness and disaster relief policy and programs. Committee members also orchestrate formal and informal, joint on-water training exercises. By participating in some of these training events, Jericho Rescue is able to revise its own training regime based on the new skills and practices it sees in use among its professional counterparts at MERCC.

Conclusions

In the end, Jericho Rescue is still a small operation the primary purpose of which is to protect and serve its own members helping members, as its motto says. But any player in a marine environment understands how quickly a weather system can change and sea-states worsen, and how rapidly things can go wrong for recreational boaters, novice and veteran alike. Most especially with the downsizing of CCG operations in the Greater Vancouver region, volunteers for Jericho Rescue understand the important role it has come to play as a vessel of opportunity during times of crisis.

The working partnership that has grown out of open relationships with the CCG, VPD Marine Unit, RCM-SAR, Vancouver Beach Lifeguards, Port Authority and related agencies illustrates a model of collaboration and inclusiveness throughout the working harbour. And while there is a definite need to revisit the deployment strategy of Canadian Coast Guard resources in western Canadian waters, it seems clear that local emergency responders have learned some new lessons in teamwork that are well worth preserving throughout the long haul. Jericho Rescue, for one, is proud to be a part of this newly integrated approach to search, rescue and emergency service delivery.

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The Sinking of *Llandovery Castle*

Daniel J. Demers

The growth of digital archives offers contemporary scholars a new and exciting source of original materials. Newspaper archives such as the ones presented free of charge by Historical Canadian Newspapers Online or the US Library of Congress program Chronicling America offer over 10 million pages of old newspapers which are rich with historical gems heretofore unobtainable without extensive and time-consuming research. This new source of historical information presents a sort of digital ‘selfie’ offering scholars an opportunity to see events as they unfolded and were presented in real time to the public. I’d like to take this opportunity to discuss an incident that occurred late in the First World War about which information has become available through these online sources. This incident had repercussions for Canadian attitudes about the war, participation in the war and for the prosecution of war crimes in subsequent years.

Like the Battle of Vimy Ridge, the sinking of the hospital ship *Llandovery Castle* served to propel the Canadian people towards national self-awareness, national unity and ultimate sovereignty. As the country learned to assert itself militarily on the world stage, one can trace the deathbed struggle of the old imperial order and the emergence of modern democracies such as Canada. The *Llandovery Castle* atrocity must also be viewed as one of the many seeds sowed during WWI from which evolved international war crimes law – germinating, at the end of the next war, into the ad hoc tribunals at Nuremberg and in the Far East. An international war crimes court finally became a reality in 2002 when the International Criminal Court was created with specific jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

What are the details of the incident? *Llandovery Castle* was a Canadian hospital ship which was torpedoed and sunk by a German U-boat on 27 June 1918. The world first learned of the sinking on 1 July 1918 when the British Admiralty revealed the incident which had occurred four days earlier. The hospital ship, on its way to England from Halifax, had a crew of 168 men, 80 officers and men of the Canadian Medical Corps and 14 nurses – 258 people in all. According to naval conventions, the ship “was displaying a brightly illuminated [electric] Red Cross sign and could not have been mistaken for anything other than a hospital ship.”

*Llandovery Castle* was sunk at 9:30 in the evening about 116 miles southwest of Ireland. The ship’s telegraph was destroyed and unable to transmit an SOS. The ship sank within 10 minutes but several lifeboats were launched. Of
those on board only 24 persons survived, the remaining 234 either drowned or were shot. Evidence disclosed at the trial supported the supposition that at least five lifeboats were launched – each of which could carry up to 52 persons. The captain’s lifeboat had collected 24 persons, and would be the only one rescued. It was determined that it was possible that one or two of the lifeboats “may have been drawn into the vortex by the sinking ship … but the evidence has shown that at least three … survived the sinking ship.”

Despite orders to leave hospital ships alone, the U-boat’s Captain, Helmut Patzig, “was of the opinion, founded on various information (including some from official sources, the accuracy of which cannot be verified)” – that hospital ships were being surreptitiously used to transport troops and munitions. He asserted that he “had sunk the ship because she was carrying American aviation officers and others in the fighting service of the allies.”

Some time after the sinking U-86 surfaced and approached the lifeboats to ascertain if the ship had airmen and/or munitions on board. Captain Patzig ordered Major Lyon, one of seven Canadian medical officers, and Captain R.A. Sylvester of the sinking vessel aboard his submarine. Lyon testified that he was forced to stand on the conning tower “despite his injured foot … [and he was] roughly hauled on board and thrust along the deck … a bone in his foot [was] broken by the handling.” Captain Patzig accused him of being part of a fighting unit and not a medical officer. Major Lyon denied the allegation, and Captain Sylvester denied any illegal uses of the hospital ship. They were released back to their lifeboat and the U-boat moved about for a while but returned. Then the second and fourth officers of Llandovery Castle (Chapman and Barton) were taken on board the U-boat. Captain Patzig asserted that the violent explosion when the ship sank proved that there must have been munitions on board, but Chapman and Barton convinced him that the “noise was caused by the explosion of the boilers.” They too were released back to the lifeboat.

The U-boat then seemed to play a kind of game of chicken – twice approaching the captain’s lifeboat in a menacing manner seemingly intent on ramming it. Each time, though, it steered sideways at the last moment. One of the lifeboats seen by Lyon was one containing the nurses, but the captain’s lifeboat lost sight of it and rescuers/searchers found no survivors of that boat. The captain’s lifeboat finally mounted its sail and was able to put distance between itself and the sub. According to reports, “[a]fter
a brief period [its] occupants … noticed firing from the U-boat … about 12 to 14 shots fell all told.”

The captain’s boat drifted for about 36 hours before it was found by a British destroyer. Five allied ships searched the area looking for other survivors but found only one empty lifeboat which evidence showed had been occupied. At the time of the sinking and the four days following the weather had been good.

When Canadians heard about the sinking of the hospital ship *Llandovery Castle*, they were incensed. It was seen to be one of the greatest atrocities of the Great War, and there was demand for a trial to punish the perpetrators. At war’s end Patzig the commander of U-86 was declared a war criminal. The British government sought to have him turned over to Britain for trial but the German government refused, asserting he would be judged before a war crimes court in Leipzig. Prior to the trial Patzig fled and at the time of the trial his whereabouts was unknown. As a result, German prosecutors charged his two subordinate officers, Lieutenants Ludwig Dithmar and Johann Boldt, with first degree murder.

In July of 1921 Canadian Major Thomas Lyon of Vancouver traveled 7,000 miles by rail and ship to testify before the War Crimes Court at Leipzig, Germany. The sub’s First (Boatswain) Mate Meissner and Captain Sylvester of *Llandovery Castle* both died before the trial and thus were unable to provide their account. Lyon’s “melodramatic” arrival minutes before the close of the trial against the two U-boat officers was sensationalized by the world’s press. His verbal attack upon the U-boat’s Captain was called “excoriating.”

When Lyon testified at the trial he called Patzig a shameful coward because he had not appeared to face the charges in court. “Why is he leaving the blame for the sinking of the hospital ship *Llandovery Castle* upon his subordinates?” Lyon asked, and “[w]hy does he not come out of his hiding place and say ‘I sunk the *Llandovery Castle* because I was told she carried American aviators to France.” Dithmar and Boldt were each sentenced to four years in prison. The original charge was reduced to manslaughter because the court determined that they “acted on the impulse of the moment and the deed was not premeditated.” The prosecutor had asked for hard labour to be part of the sentence, but that was not included by the court. The Ocala [Florida] Evening Star’s headline, “German Justice Only a Joke,” is indicative of the disbelieving reaction in Canada and the United States to the lenient sentences.

A month later Patzig surfaced in South America and manned up. He declared his intent to return to Leipzig and surrender himself for trial. He asserted that he “was alone responsible” for the sinking. Despite this, Patzig never showed up for a trial, and it didn’t seem like anyone was searching very hard for him. As well, Lieutenant Boldt escaped prison in November, four months after his incarceration. Dithmar followed his lead two months later escaping in January of 1922.

Trial testimony from German crew members indicated that only four men were topside when the shelling and ramming occurred – Patzig, Boldt, Dithmar and Meissner. Testimony at the trial indicated that “[w]hile firing, the U-boat moved about … did not submerge … but continued on the surface.” The prosecution asserted that the firing was directed at the lifeboats after they had been rammed forcing survivors into the sea, and the court concurred. The court’s decision was based, in large part, on the testimony of both the German submarine crew and Canadian survivors.

According to newspaper reports of the trial, in the days following the incident, German crew members were extremely depressed. According to testimony, Captain Patzig was confronted by his chief engineer and Patzig told him “he could never do it a second time.” The court was not certain what exactly he meant by this, but concluded that he meant both torpedoing the ship and subsequently ramming and shooting at the lifeboats. Despite Patzig’s apparent remorse, he nonetheless ordered the crew to say nothing. He called the crew together the following day asking them to remain silent about the preceding day’s occurrence. He told them “he [alone] would be responsible to God and his own conscience.” Patzig asked for and obtained a promise to maintain silence from Dithmar and Boldt – both testified that “they had promised Patzig to be silent” which, in their minds, justified their refusal to testify about some elements of the sinking. Patzig’s
conduct also figured highly in the decision. Apparently he made no entry in the logbook and entered an incorrect statement of the route taken by the ship on the chart so it would look like the submarine was a long way from where the torpedoing occurred.

After it found out about the sinking of Llandovery Castle, the Canadian government immediately issued a new war bond poster. “Victory Bonds Will Help Stop This,” it read. The poster depicted a survivor holding a drowned nurse while cursing U-86. Printed on a life preserver in the foreground is Llandovery Castle.

The indictment against Captain Patzig was quashed in 1931 when the German Reichstag enacted amnesty legislation in the build-up to the Second World War. He re-appeared and re-entered the German Kriegsmarine as Brümmer-Patzig in 1933 and served as a naval officer until 1945. In his First World War U-boat career he is credited with sinking 24 ships and damaging one. During the Second World War he was awarded the Iron Cross and War Merit Cross. He died in 1984 at the age of 94, having never been tried for the atrocity of sinking the Canadian hospital ship. Dithmar also served in the Kriegsmarine during WWII. He never served the remainder of his sentence. He died in 1970. Johann-Boldt, who retired from the navy in 1918, died in 1931 having never served out the remainder of his sentence.

So, why discuss this incident in 2015? First, the mass of interesting material that can now be found through new online sources has provided context and texture for the incident that had been missing before. This material is easily accessible to any researcher and helps to illustrate public opinion of many of the events of the war. Second, this incident, and the aftermath, is an early illustration of the difficulty of prosecuting international war crimes, particularly in the absence of political will.

Notes
4. Ibid., p. 710.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. "German War Trials: Judgment in Case of Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt," p. 713.
10. Ibid.
16. "German War Trials: Judgment in Case of Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt."
17. Ibid., p. 717.
18. Ibid., p. 716.

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Making Waves

A Whole-of-Government Marine Response Capability is Critical
K. Joseph Spears

Some marine incidents in the last 18 months highlight why it is important for Canada to have a well-oiled whole-of-government marine response capability. Recent international marine incidents include: the fire that broke out on a car ferry – Norman Atlantic – in the Adriatic in December 2014, in which 13 people died; the auto carrier Hoegh Osaka which was grounded deliberately near Southampton to prevent it from capsizing in January 2015; and the fire on board the supply ship HMCS Protecteur in February 2014 which led to loss of power and the ship drifting off Hawaii. In Canadian waters, incidents include: the drifting of MV Simushir off Haida Gwaii, British Columbia; the laden tanker Australian Spirit which drifted off Halifax; the grounding of the icebreaker CCG Ann Harvey off Newfoundland’s south coast; the chemical fire at Port Metro Vancouver; the fire at Squamish Terminal in BC; and the leak of bunker fuel from MV Marathassa into English Bay, Vancouver. The disturbing thing to note is that these incidents all happened in the space of just a few months.

Luckily, these Canadian marine incidents did not become major incidents. But this does not mean we shouldn’t discuss Canada’s marine response capability. Marine incidents continue to happen on a regular basis and the potential for damage is immense. The recent explosion of a chemical storage facility in Tianjin, China, highlights the need for a government response capability for incidents involving hazardous materials.

Marine response requires a robust whole-of-government response across the federal government. There have been several federal reports that have been written in recent years, and I want to discuss the recommendations of several of them – the 2010 Office of Auditor General (OAG) Commissioner of Environment and Sustainable Development report Oil Spills from Ships, the 2013 Tanker Safety Expert Panel report and the Butler Review of the recent oil spill off Vancouver.

The 2010 report Oil Spills from Ships highlighted the need for Canada to increase its capability. As the report stated, it is not merely a matter of the lead federal agency, the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), responding to an oil spill or other marine incident. Marine response involves many players and partners who must come together and work under intense time pressure and public scrutiny. In many respects, Canada has been the victim of its own success as there have been very few major marine incidents over the last 30 years to force different agencies, with different mandates, perspectives and philosophies to work together. But that can quickly change when there is an incident.

The 2010 OAG report recommendations were accepted by the government of Canada and some efforts have been made to create coordinated thinking at the Deputy Minister’s level. This has been done with the creation of the Interdepartmental Marine Pollution Committee (IMPC) which was developed to promote a whole-of-government response.

The OAG review was followed by the federally mandated 2013 Tanker Safety Expert Panel chaired by Captain Gordon Houston, former president of the Vancouver
Fraser Port Authority, and consisting of three highly experienced marine response practitioners. In two reports the panel made 88 recommendations on the response to oil spills and hazardous material spills. The panel’s first report, entitled *Setting the Course for the Future: A Review of Canada’s Ship Source Oil Spill Preparedness and Response Regime*, was released on 13 November 2013. The second report, entitled *Setting the Course for the Future, Phase II: Requirements for the Arctic and for Hazardous and Noxious Substances Nationally*, was delivered to the government in November 2014 and released to the public on 8 April 2015.3

One of the most critical recommendations made by the panel was the need for centralized decision-making in marine response. Arguably, an important accomplishment, set out in phase 2, was its expansion to examine marine casualty management which addresses how one deals with actual marine incidents. On this subject the panel had only one recommendation, namely “[t]he government of Canada should improve the timeliness of decision-making for marine casualties by establishing a centralized marine casualty decision-making authority acting in the public interest similar to those authorities established in the United Kingdom and Australia.”7 In these two jurisdictions, a single individual is appointed to address the incident because rapid decision-making is the key to protecting people and the environment, and decisions by a committee of multiple agencies will create unwanted delays. To paraphrase a British government representative, there is a clear decision-maker that the Minister must “either back or sack.” The key is to have a single decision-maker who can make prompt decisions in real time.

After the MV *Marathassa* oil spill in Vancouver Harbour in April 2015, which generated a great deal of public, political and media attention, an independent review of the response was initiated. This review was completed by former assistant Commissioner of the Coast Guard, John Butler. His investigation included over 23 different groups involved in the response in the attempt to learn lessons from it. The *Butler Review* was released on 19 July 2015, and examined what worked well and what could be improved. It presented 25 recommendations to improve oil spill response. This was a prompt positive step forward and highlights the importance of examining such events.6

The *Butler Review* highlights the importance of building relationships and strengthening Canada’s marine response capability on an ongoing basis, which requires inputs from all parties. The response to the oil spill highlighted that the time of an incident is not the time to be making friends. There must be constant exercises to learn to work together and constant thinking about how to deliver marine response capability on Canada’s coasts (and in inland waters as well). The *Butler Review* noted candidly that “there appeared to be confusion among some partners regarding the roles and responsibilities of key partners in oil spill response.” This is an interesting – and surprising – finding given that Canada’s marine response regime is now almost 20 years old. However, it identifies a gap, using a real incident, that was addressed in its recommendations.

The *Butler Review* shows that there is a clear need for increased training exercises for marine response. Canada needs to be ready to respond to a wide range of incidents in its vast ocean space. As shipping increases in the Arctic, this vast ocean space will become even bigger and more remote. There is a key role for the Department of National Defence (DND), in particular the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). With the development of the new Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessels (AOPS), there needs to be cooperation among government agencies when it comes to Arctic operations. Canada needs to bring together various agencies to work to achieve common ocean governance goals on an ongoing regular basis in the Arctic and elsewhere. This will pay large dividends when a prompt and vigorous marine response is required in a remote coastal location along some of Canada’s 244,000 kms of coastline. The oil spill in Vancouver’s English Bay occurred in Canada’s largest port, with a relatively well-resourced marine response capability and a long experience with marine spills, but what would happen if...
a spill occurred miles from a port? We need to get creative in how we use limited financial resources.

Although the Coast Guard is the lead agency for marine incidents, the RCN can play an important and increased role in response to marine incidents. For example, the RCN illustrated its capability in marine response in the March 2015 grounding and subsequent flooding of the engine room of the icebreaker CCG *Ann Harvey* off the south coast of Newfoundland. The highly trained divers and their specialized equipment from the RCN Fleet Diving Unit (Atlantic) were airlifted to the ship using fixed and rotary wing aircraft from the Royal Canadian Air Force. HMCS *Charlottetown* stood by along with other CCG vessels as emergency repairs were completed in an exposed anchorage during blizzard conditions. *Ann Harvey* was then successfully towed to St. John's, Newfoundland, for repairs.

The RCN played a very important role in this marine response with specialized skills and equipment. This incident highlights a holistic whole-of-government approach to marine response. In this case, the ongoing cooperation and teamwork between the Canadian Coast Guard and RCN paid huge dividends as the ship was saved during adverse marine conditions.

However, ongoing cooperation and teamwork is not always the norm among marine responders. The *Butler Review* really says it all when it states that there was confusion about various roles. An effective marine response requires exercising and training. Real-time exercises, while expensive, pay huge dividends both in terms of identifying gaps and capability as well as building personal relationships among marine response agency personnel. Time and time again marine response is based upon people working together.

**The Future Framework**

Marine incidents will continue to happen and will grow in complexity in coming years as vessel size increases. With more and larger ships, there will be more potential for major marine incidents, particularly if ships are carrying dangerous cargo. Increased Arctic shipping also presents its own challenges. These recent reviews highlight gaps and, while no one wants to find out that there are gaps in the system, it is better to find this out now prior to a major incident. What we need to do in Canada is set up the institutional framework to ensure effective marine response. This framework must include the private sector, given that the Canadian marine response regime is based on the polluter pays principle. The polluter pay system means that the owner of the cause of the marine incident is responsible for the costs of the marine response. The government of Canada normally takes a monitoring or a supervisory rather than a response role when it comes to marine response. We must build on the recommendations from the Tanker Safety Expert Panel and *Butler Review* to develop an ongoing mechanism that is funded and exercised to bring together a robust whole-of-government marine response.

Buttressing marine response needs to be a component of all federal partners with a marine focus which includes the Royal Canadian Navy. In Canada, we do ad hoc really well. We need to strength these informal structures as well as create a formal framework of response that is constantly reviewed and properly funded. We need to move beyond our ad hoc approach towards a more formalized structure of marine response. Canada also needs to develop its marine casualty management regime with the appointment of one individual who has the necessary federal authority to make proper decisions in real time as recommended by the recent Tanker Safety Expert Panel. In the 21st century we need to formalize these personal and ad hoc relationships on marine response. Canada will be a stronger ocean state for strengthening its marine response in a complex world.

**Notes**

1. The full report can be found at www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_cesd_201012_01_e_34424.html.
3. Both reports can be found at www.tc.gc.ca/eng/tankersafetyexpertpanel/menu.htm.
5. Background on the UK regime can be found in an October 2012 article in BC Shipping News, available at http://wavepointconsulting.ca/united-kingdom-oil-pollution-response.
7. Ibid., Executive Summary, p. 7.

The RCN’s Fuel Crisis
Ken Hansen

Rumours that shipbuilder Chantier Davie Canada has been asked to develop an interim replenishment ship for the RCN have been confirmed by a media report.1 However, far from the simple conversion of a tanker to provide fuel only, the Davie plan seems to show a full-blown sustainment ship.2 Billed as the Resolve-class, imagery of the concept shows a large ship with flight deck and hangar aft, large superstructure forward of the hangar, and twin replenishment ‘goal posts’ forward of the superstructure. If the image is correct, this hardly looks like an ‘interim’ fuel-only capability.

The reaction from Irving Shipbuilding was predictable. The same media report states that Irving also tabled an interim solution proposal. Irving is displeased that Davie has taken what it views as a roundabout route to circumvent Davie’s elimination from the competition for a stake in the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS). In a way, Irving is right. However, overriding its concerns is the fact that the logistical situation – particularly the provision of fuel – has become grave for the navy. The major fire in HMCS Protecteur and the severe rust-out problems in HMCS Preserver are developments that occurred subsequent to the NSPS competition and they have created consequences requiring urgent corrective action. The longer the navy goes without an at-sea replenishment capability, the more its utility as a blue-water navy diminishes.

So far, Seaspan has been quiet about the situation. This is probably due to a media report that the two Joint Support Ships, which were to be built on the West Coast, may not be built at all due to delays and anticipated high cost overruns.3 Reports reaching me indicate a significant complicating factor is the high cost of housing in the lower mainland of British Columbia. Unaffordable housing is proving to be a major impediment to attracting skilled personnel for the trade positions needed by the shipyard.

This is a regional problem that needs rapid action by all orders of government.

Meanwhile, there has been strident criticism of the federal government by both opposition parties about the single-source nature of the discussion with Davie. Characterized as unfair favouritism, the charge has been laid repeatedly that the Harper government is using this issue to ‘buy’ votes in Quebec in the run-up to the federal election in October.4

There are several problems here but they are all linked by a general misunderstanding about the nature of strategy. The government failed to understand that its shipbuilding strategy could not succeed if it was not integrated with other economic factors, such as the employment and housing markets on the West Coast. Irving failed to understand that strategy must be adjusted to take into account new issues that were not involved when the shipbuilding plans were first formulated. Political critics of the government’s direct negotiation with only one shipyard failed to understand the difference between situations in which deliberate planning can occur and situations which require crisis planning.

Strategy that is too focused on one national aspect or sector of the economy misses many key requirements for success. The government must coordinate the activities of a myriad of agencies and programs if the strategy is find a fertile field in which to take root. The key goals of the shipbuilding strategy were development of the industrial base and employment for Canadians. The Harper government likes to think that market forces are the best way to achieve balance in the economy. The problem is that shipbuilding is an extremely complicated technological
industry with far-reaching supply chain linkages. It is also a human endeavour, which means that more than monetary, technical and industrial factors are at play. The difficulties being encountered with this expensive and complicated strategic initiative are the result of narrow, sector-specific thinking.

The problem with a gap in naval replenishment capabilities is that the RCN is vitally dependent on the capabilities to extend the endurance of the combat fleet. The fuel capacity of the RCN’s current frigates is at an all-time low (0.10 ton of fuel per ton of displacement). By comparison, the River-class frigates from the latter part of the Second World War had more than four times that amount on a proportional basis. They were ships designed for operations in the North Atlantic. The Pacific Ocean demands far greater endurance. Diesel propulsion gives the Halifax-class a nominal endurance of approximately 7,100 nautical miles at 15 knots on 460 cubic metres of fuel. Higher speeds require the use of gas turbines, which reduce endurance dramatically.

Replenishment at sea has become integral to how the navy operates at long distances from a support base, stays somewhere for a long time or gets anywhere in a hurry. Fuel is so important to the operation of the RCN’s ‘short-legged’ ships that, when a replenishment ship is available, refuelling is conducted every few days.

The RCN believes that it will be able to rely on allies for replenishment during the gap period. The problem is that replenishment capabilities are on the decline in all navies. As the cost of warships increase, the apparent relative value of replenishment vessels diminishes. That same thinking limited the construction of Canadian replenishment ships in the early 1960s to just one, HMCS Provider, not the three ships the RCN had requested. Protecteur and Preserver were not approved until after the Cuban Missile Crisis revealed just how shockingly inadequate the RCN’s endurance was. The same thinking has limited their replacements to only two in number when three (or more) are clearly required.

If the Davie plan takes any longer than six months to produce an interim capability for a fuel-only replenishment ship, then it should be rejected outright. Lack of at-sea replenishment capability is a bona fide crisis that has crippled Canada’s navy. The government is fully within its right to take executive action to address the immediate and urgent logistical shortcoming of the navy. It should absolutely not play politics in order to reap an electoral benefit. Time is of the essence here, not political outcomes. The federal government also needs to ensure that future ships produced under the NSPS have an abundant fuel capacity and superlative endurance. And it needs to become more directly engaged in ensuring that its strategic initiatives are properly planned and coordinated. Benign neglect is no way to ensure that industrial development goals, defence plans and employment targets are achieved.

Notes
2. The image can be seen at https://www.flickr.com/photos/117123125@N07/18506984914/.

A Suggestion for Future Fleet Composition
Ian Kennett

I just discovered Canadian Naval Review and I have enjoyed exploring it so far. I would like to make a suggestion for the future fleet composition of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). I believe that such a fleet would be balanced, flexible, effective and relatively economical to establish. Of note, I favour off-the-shelf proven designs that require very little ‘Canadianization.’ For the surface combatant project, I support choosing a very flexible common hull design from Denmark. Here is my suggestion for the future fleet.
1. **Absalon-class destroyer.** Rather than build a hugely expensive Joint Support Ship (JSS), two to four **Absalon** destroyers with the large flex deck would be excellent. These ships can, as necessary, carry Leopard II tanks or all manner of smaller vehicles, plus soldiers and their equipment. In addition, they carry modern missiles, guns and electronics, and they have a long range. They are command and control as well as anti-air defence (AAD) capable.

2. **Iver Huitfeldt-class frigates.** I would suggest that 10 (initially) of these very versatile and powerful ships, economically based on the same hull as the **Absalon**, would serve as the backbone of the fleet. They are larger and more powerful than the **Halifax**-class frigates but with much smaller crews in both number and in crew shifts. Of the current modern designs available, these are, by far, the least expensive to build.

3. **Halifax-class frigate.** The current upgrade program for these ships will soon be complete. These capable ships will undergo a second upgrade in the not-too-distant future. I propose that of the 12 initially upgraded frigates, only the six most suitable (how that is determined can be debated, it could be based on which ships are youngest, or in best condition) undergo the second upgrade with the other six retired on a per ship basis as the **Huitfeldt**-class ships are commissioned. In this manner, there would be a cost saving achieved by not giving all of the **Halifax**-class the second upgrade, and there would be no loss of fleet numbers as the new ships are completed. In addition, there are many sensor and weapon systems which could be transferred from the **Halifax** (and retired **Iroquois**) ships to the **Absalon** and **Huitfeldt** ships.

So, this means the RCN fleet would be composed of two to four **Absalon** destroyers, 10 **Huitfeldt** frigates and six **Halifax** frigates, for a total of 18 to 20 hulls. The **Huitfeldt** assembly could subsequently be kept open at a reduced pace in order to build an additional two (or more) **Huitfeldt**-class ships as the remaining six **Halifax**-class frigates are gradually retired. Hence, a sharp fleet of 14 or more hulls would be available over the medium to long term.

What else does the RCN require? What about at-sea replenishment? While Davie Shipyard in Levis, Quebec, is hunting for civilian ships to convert, I propose that the RCN aggressively pursue the short- to mid-term lease of USNS **Bainbridge** and USNA **Rainer**, two modern, mid-life fleet replenishment ships. I would assume that the US Navy would welcome some revenue given that these ships are being retired due to cost cutting in the US fleet. These two ships would be more than adequate for an interim solution prior to the, likely delayed, arrival of the **Berlin**-class ships. It should be noted that Davie Shipyard is working on the conversion of a commercial hull for a Canadian Navy at-sea replenishment ship. But the plan is for only one – this will still leave one coast without a replenishment ship.

The RCN will also have six – hopefully – Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS), even though at 17 knots they are far too slow, plus four completed and updated **Victoria**-class submarines. However the RCN still needs a capable replacement for the **Kingston**-class patrol vessels. These need to be much faster (at least 20 knots) and effectively armed with, perhaps, a 57 mm gun similar to those on the **Halifax** frigates. About 12 need to be built, again based on a proven off-the-shelf design. These should be a corvette type of ship. The ability to have a helicopter as large as the navy’s Cyclone (the very late replacement for the ancient **Sea Kings**), as well as the search and rescue **Cormorant**, land on the ship is a must given the enormous distance involved on Canada’s coastlines.

The last thing on my list is an increase in the number of maritime patrol aircraft. The logical choice would be to upgrade four more Aurora aircraft, so the entire original 18 Auroras are upgraded. The purchase of a few smaller planes such as Bombardier’s Q300 Dash 8 maritime surveillance aircraft would provide an effective and important coastal patrol capability, and could be used as quick response search aircraft in certain situations.

I would appreciate your comments. Thanks. 😊
A View from the West: Migration Policy Adrift in Southeast Asia

Nicole Hilborne

The disruption of a well-traveled human smuggling route through Southeast Asia this past spring led to a humanitarian crisis at sea. Thousands of migrants were left adrift off the coast of Thailand for over a week while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) dithered on how to respond. The events left ASEAN states open to criticism both for the lack of urgency in their response and for their disregard of international law. The monsoon season has since provided a temporary lull in migration and a reprieve for Southeast Asia as the Andaman Sea is too dangerous for passage. However, the rain cannot wash away the underlying conditions that caused the crisis in the first place. Without action by regional and international actors, the saga is set to repeat itself with the return of calm seas this autumn.

Initially the abandoned migrants were taken in, with over 2,000 people coming ashore to Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia in one weekend. But these three states feared that they would be perceived as welcoming for the thousands more still at sea and, in order to deter further migrants, they all enacted policies of turning back the boats. The vessels were provided with aid and, in some cases, mechanical repairs, but they were then sent back into international waters. This quickly led to what Human Rights Watch called “a deadly game of human ping-pong,” as approximately 6,000 migrants were left drifting in the Strait of Malacca. There were reports of Indonesian fishermen defying their government by providing aid and shelter to the migrants but most boats were left to fend for themselves. After nine days, in response to international pressure and promises of funds, Malaysia and Indonesia sent their navies to rescue the migrants prior to a meeting to address the crisis involving ASEAN states and the international community. Thailand later agreed to assist with the rescue efforts, and reluctantly allowed the United States to undertake surveillance flights in its airspace to locate the boats, but Bangkok still refused to accept any refugees.

In the wake of that underwhelming response, ASEAN countries have continued to be criticized for disregarding international law including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the 1951 Refugee Convention. By refusing to rescue and/or turning away boats, ASEAN states are putting vulnerable people in a dangerous situation. In order to prevent this from happening again, the governments involved are seeking ways to halt the steady stream of migrants by stopping their departure in the first place.

While the plan is still in the development stage, it appears to be following the lead of the European Union’s current strategy for the migration crisis in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med) which involves addressing smuggling operations at their source. ASEAN has announced the development of a human trafficking task force, and Burma and Bangladesh have pledged to increase coastal patrols.

Migrants from Burma* (also known as Myanmar) and Bangladesh have fled poverty and persecution for years by traveling via a smuggling network across the Andaman Sea, through Thailand and on to Malaysia and Indonesia. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 25,000 people made the journey between January and March of this year alone.1 However, following the discovery in May of mass graves and detention centres used by human smugglers to hold migrants captive near the Thailand-Malaysia border, the smuggling network was disrupted. Allegations that the Thai government was not only aware of but was involved in the network forced the government to crack down on the smugglers and their collaborators, including local officials, police and, notably, an army general. The consequence of this response was that smugglers, fearing arrest, started abandoning their human cargo at sea.

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Unfortunately, efforts to reduce the number of boats that reach foreign shores are likely to provide only temporary relief. Given that human smuggling is a multi-million dollar industry, smugglers would just find different means if their current avenues are disrupted. Without addressing the underlying issues there will still be people desperate to flee and those who will exploit the situation for a profit. In order to end the maritime migration, countries must address the conditions that are causing the mass departures in the first place.

This is where the Southeast Asian crisis, compared to other migrant crises, has a silver lining. Unlike the asylum seekers arriving in Europe, who are coming from failed/failing states in the Middle East and Africa, the Southeast Asian migrants are coming from two states with governments theoretically capable of facilitating a solution. Yet, despite the fact that aid agencies estimate that the migrants are split almost equally between Bangladesh and Burma, the Burmese government adamantly denies it is a source of illegal migrants. To date, most of the people the Burmese navy has rescued have been repatriated to Bangladesh as they either self-identified, or an investigation determined they are Bangladeshi. These findings are questionable due to the fact the majority of migrants from Burma are ethnic Rohingya, a Muslim group the government defines as illegal Bangladeshi immigrants even though the community has existed there for generations. The Rohingya are denied citizenship in Burma and are regularly subject to violence by Buddhist extremists. Even Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma’s Nobel Laureate and democratic rights champion, has declined to speak out on their behalf. With such poor treatment it is not surprising that nearly one in 10 Rohingya have fled the country in recent years, a statistic that could easily change if conditions improved. However, the international community has been reluctant to pressure the Burmese government amid its recent democratic opening and ASEAN’s policy of non-interference makes it ill-equipped to be a catalyst for change on this issue.

The optimal solution is of course to change the economic and political situation but given the complexity of addressing land-based issues, an interim solution could be the establishment of refugee processing centres in Burma. A similar strategy was used in the region, called the Orderly Departure Program (ODP), after the Vietnam War. Like the current crisis, neighbouring countries were inundated with illegal arrivals from Vietnam and began to turn people away. In response, the ODP was created with the United States and its recent democratic opening and ASEAN’s policy of non-interference makes it ill-equipped to be a catalyst for change on this issue. While the ODP certainly had political motives – many successful refugees had been on the US side of the war or had Vietnamese-American children – this does not mean a similar program could not be successful today.

The European Commission has proposed a strategy for the Mediterranean crisis in which refugees could seek asylum from a location in North Africa, yet such a plan has not been suggested for Southeast Asia, despite the successful history of the ODP in the region. If Rohingya migrants could be screened and resettled without setting sail it would not only save lives, but also reduce the need for costly maritime rescue missions. While increasing naval and coast guard patrols as soon as possible is essential, it is necessary to address the underlying conditions of the crisis, or provide an alternate option, to create a long-term solution. Focusing solely on rescue missions and interdictions at sea will do little to stop the migration from occurring and becoming deadlier, and will only amount to an expensive Band-Aid on a wound unlikely to heal any time soon.

Notes
* The Canadian government policy is to use the name Burma, not Myanmar.

Nicole Hilborne is a research assistant at Maritime Forces Pacific at CFB Esquimalt.
Dollars and Sense: 
The Defence Agenda for Canada’s 42nd Parliament

Dave Perry

As this issue reaches you, Canada’s 42nd federal election will be wrapping up. Hopefully, the campaign featured a fulsome discussion of the foreign and defence issues facing the country and how Canada’s new government plans to address them. With a dedicated debate on foreign policy and unusually long campaign, there were certainly many opportunities to discuss the position of each party on all aspects of their international policy. With the campaign almost over, though, much work is needed to chart a path for the Department of National Defence (DND) to translate party platform positions into a new defence agenda.

As a first step, the new government needs to articulate its foreign policy priorities, preferably by conducting a thorough foreign policy review – a White Paper on foreign policy hasn’t been issued since 2005. This isn’t needed simply for the purposes of giving the policy staff in the Pearson Building something to do but, rather, to prioritize Canada’s international policy in a way that can strategically shape defence forces. Since early 2008, Canadian defence policy has been directed by the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS). That document is extremely broad and only briefly describes the international environment before it delves into the type of high-level missions and roles the military would be expected to perform.

Perhaps at the time it was well understood exactly what kind of capabilities were needed to deliver on the government’s foreign policy objectives in a coherent way, although it is difficult to find evidence of this. Regardless, since CFDS was issued in 2008, the world has changed and, just as important, DND’s fiscal room has shrunk. In combination, these two facts make a review imperative so that it can provide strategic direction to DND.

To point out but one example of a badly needed update, when the CFDS was written, Russia was still regarded as a cooperative partner by the West, as it had not yet intervened in Georgia, Estonia or Ukraine. Clearly, Canada’s relationship with its neighbour to the North has changed and this has significant implications for the Canadian Armed Forces. Abroad, Canada has now entered into an apparently indefinite deployment of troops, sailors and air personnel to Eastern Europe to reassure allies and deter the Russians. At home, Canada’s deteriorating relations with Russia have likely made upgrading North American air defences a high priority. Given upgrades to Russian strategic forces and provocative probing of North American air defence, the air defence of North America should be an issue of considerable concern since the last major updates to these defences occurred in the late 1980s. These are but two impacts from one global change since 2008 and multiple others exist. The next government needs to assess how the geostrategic environment has changed, how it wants to engage in the world, and what role the military will play in supporting its foreign policy.

The need to undertake this review has been made more pressing by DND’s fiscal circumstances which have changed dramatically since 2008. CFDS was issued in the spring of 2008 before the global financial crisis emerged in the fall. When the Harper government published its CFDS, it laid out a plan for long-term reinvestment predicated on progressive defence budget increases over two decades. As soon as the federal government initiated a stimulus program in response to the Great Recession in 2009, that plan’s fiscal basis became shaky. Despite the promises in the CFDS, sure enough in 2010 DND’s budget was cut, and it was cut again repeatedly until 2014. As a result, the projected 20 years of budget growth lasted only two years, and DND lost almost $4 billion a year from its annual budget.

In its much-delayed 2015 budget, the Harper government offered a moderate increase to DND’s funding formula.
that will partially offset the impact of its past cuts. Beginning in 2017 the Harper government pledged to increase DND’s escalator, the amount the defence budget increases each year, to 3%. In 2008, the CFDS changed the escalator from 1.5% to 2% starting in 2011/2012. If the 2015 plan is implemented, it will take effect in 2017. Projected forward, the extra funding that accures over time will restore DND’s budget back to the level it was projected to reach just at the end of the CFDS 20-year period in the late 2020s. In the meantime, the impact of the defence cuts since 2011 have effectively removed roughly $30 billion of the funding that was supposed to go to DND to implement the CFDS. To put that figure in context, it is roughly equivalent to the total project budgets for the combat package of Canadian Surface Combatants and Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships outlined in the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy.

Ideally, the gap between the current defence policy and the available funding would be addressed by an immediate increase to the defence budget. The budgetary need is immediate, and the recent history of promised future budget increase leaves significant room to doubt that the Budget 2015 pledge will be enacted as planned even if the Conservative Party forms the next government. To date, however, none of the three main political parties have provided any indication that a short-term budget increase is even a remote possibility.

As of August 2015, Canada was teetering on the edge of a recession brought about by plummeting oil prices. By some estimates, the resulting drop in Canada’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has already erased the surplus the Harper government had forecast for 2015/2016, all other revenues and expenses remaining equal. Clearly, however, the prospect that both federal revenues and spending will remain unchanged is a non-starter in an election season. At the time of writing neither the Liberal Party nor the New Democratic Party had released their campaign platforms, but each had announced a suite of proposals that could increase the demands on the federal treasury.

While the Harper government has derided its competitors ‘tax and spend’ programs as threatening the federal books, it too has a number of plans with serious fiscal implications. In the month and a half before the election was called the government made spending announcements totaling $14 billion through a mix of both new and old announcements. Some of these were defence projects, including a multitude of mostly minor infrastructure projects, the long-awaited announcement of the winner of the Army’s Standard Military Pattern Truck contract and the signing of a letter of intent to proceed with an interim refuel/supply ship capability for the navy. The vast bulk of the spending announced was not earmarked for defence though, as the bulk of it was announced by Infrastructure Canada and the regional development agencies. Further, in just the first week of the campaign, the Conservatives announced tax cuts that will reduce federal revenues by $1.6 billion a year once introduced.

In sum, regardless of which party forms the government, non-defence spending priorities abound, making it likely that DND will continue to face a budget too small to deliver on current defence plans. All of this points to a need to define clear defence priorities, shaped by the government’s views about the world and what it would like the Canadian military to do in it. The emergence of new strategic priorities since 2008 and a reduced defence budget mean significant adjustments will be needed to reorient Canada’s defence policy. The lowest priorities need to be dropped to accommodate more pressing concerns and this needs to happen as early in the 42nd Parliament as possible.

Notes

David Perry is the Senior Analyst of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (formerly the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute).
**Warship Developments: Major Surface Combatants**

**Doug Thomas**

**DDG 1000, USS Zumwalt**

Work continues at Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine, on DDG-1000, a 600-foot long, 14,500 tonne multi-mission surface combatant classed as a guided-missile destroyer and introducing many advanced technologies. The ship, which has a very unique appearance, was christened in 2014 as USS *Zumwalt*, named after the 1970-74 Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt who introduced many innovative personnel policies known as ‘Z-Grams.’ *Zumwalt* is expected to achieve initial operating capability in 2016, and be followed by two more units, the last in 2021.

There has been great concern over the cost of these vessels. The class in its various iterations was originally planned to be 32 ships strong, then 24, then seven and now three. Part of the reason for high unit cost of these ships now is that much of the research and development for a radical hull design and new propulsion, sensor and weapon systems is being amortized over very few ships. However, this new technology will surely find its way into future vessels, and the *Zumwalt*-class ships will likely be used as trial platforms for rail guns, particle-beam weapons and revolutionary new propulsion systems such as the Permanent Magnetic-Synchronous Motor (PMM). PMM will not be ready for DDG 1000 (the Advanced Induction Motor will be installed instead), but it should be fitted in a later ship. PMM, in conjunction with the integrated power system, will provide 10 times the electrical power available in current destroyers – which can be used for laser and other energy-intensive weapons.

DDG 1000’s total ship computing environment will maximize automation and optimize crew size – it is anticipated that the complement of these vessels will be less than half that of an *Arleigh Burke* DDG. *Zumwalt* will have a broad range of combat systems, including many types of anti-air and anti-surface missiles, and anti-submarine rockets, capable of being launched from tubes arrayed around the outside edge of the foc’sle rather than in the centre as in current guided-missile destroyers and cruisers. This leaves space for the advanced gun system: two 155mm guns capable of firing rocket-assisted precision-guided projectiles some 80 nautical miles, in order to provide naval gunfire support to amphibious forces. Relatively minor finetuning of weapons fit includes a recent decision to replace the secondary armament of 57mm guns (similar to those in the Canadian Patrol Frigate) with Mk. 46 30mm guns, which are considered to be more effective against close-in swarm attacks by fast attack craft in chokepoint areas.

**Royal Navy Aircraft Carriers**

This two-ship class, HM Ships *Queen Elizabeth* and *Prince of Wales*, replaces the three much smaller Invincible-class carriers. For a time it seemed that *Prince of Wales* might be cancelled or sold abroad, however a recent government decision to complete the carrier for the Royal Navy should ensure that at least one RN aircraft carrier will be available for operations at all times.

The UK will acquire 150 F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters to operate from the carriers, but they will also be available for Royal Air Force operations ashore. Although the F-35B is fully capable of performing vertical landing, in a similar fashion to the way that the Harrier and Sea Harrier operated, this method of operation places limitations on the loads that the aircraft is capable of carrying back to the ship. In order to avoid the costly disposal at sea of both fuel and munitions, the Royal Navy is developing the Shipborne Rolling Vertical Landing (SRVL) technique for its operation of the Lightning II. SRVL is a hybrid
landing technique that utilizes the Lightning’s vectored thrust capability to slow its forward speed to around 70 knots, which allows it to make a rolling landing using its disc brakes without the need of an arrester wire. This profile will likely be limited to relatively calm sea states.

USN Ford-Class Aircraft Carriers

USS Gerald R. Ford, to be commissioned in 2016, is the first of three new Ford-class carriers currently under construction or authorized, which will replace the decommissioned USS Enterprise and two of the Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The eventual class size is expected to be 10, replacing all of the Nimitz-class. There is a lot of new technology going into Ford. A key type of technology is modern nuclear reactors which will provide three times as much electrical power as those in Nimitz.

One of the requirements for this greatly enhanced power generation is the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), replacing the steam catapults of earlier systems. Interestingly, similar technology is used in roller coasters! EMALS will result in a smoother launch, will eliminate a lot of below flight deck complexity, and will require fewer people to maintain and operate. There have been some initial glitches with this system, but there is confidence that these issues will be resolved. Once operational, 25% more launches per day may be achieved in EMALS-fitted carriers, compared with the Nimitz-class. EMALS will permit finetuning of the force used in launching various aircraft; this should minimize wear and tear on lighter airframes. For example, unmanned aerial vehicles such as the X47B are considerably lighter than manned aircraft such as the F-18 E/F Super Hornet or the E-2 Hawkeye carrier-borne air surveillance and control aircraft. EMALS is one of a number of technical developments that will reduce the ship’s company in the Ford-class by at least 600 compared to the Nimitz-class. This will provide a major cost saving over the planned 50-year service life of these new ships.

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In conclusion, the number of units being constructed in new warship classes is generally smaller than in preceding classes for a number of reasons – cost likely being the major factor. However, the oceans are not becoming smaller and one hopes that planners will maintain navies of sufficient size to fulfill their assigned roles. Nevertheless, quality and automation will certainly make the new vessels more combat-capable than their predecessors, and this may offset the reduced numbers.
Book Reviews


Reviewed by Colonel (Ret’d) Brian K. Wentzell

The Secret War for the Middle East is an important reference for those people interested in the modern history of the Middle East. It describes events dating from 1919 through the early second decade of the 21st century. The authors, Commander Youseff Aboul-Enein, USN, and his brother Captain (Ret’d) Basil Aboul-Enein, USAF, focus on the activities of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and the United Kingdom in the area stretching from Egypt through Vichy Syria and to Afghanistan during World War II. They also review the impact of British and French colonization in the region and various Arab activities to counter the colonial regimes. Their aim is to shed light on Allied and Axis actions and operations in this time period, and provide some insight as to how these actions affected the postwar world.

The book reveals interesting details of the efforts of the Nazis and Fascists to encourage and assist Arab leaders in challenging colonial rule, whilst advancing their own agendas including the defeat of Great Britain, the elimination of Palestine, access to oil and the Suez Canal, and linking up with Japan.

The primary audience for this book is not the political scientist or historian or general readers – politicians, diplomats, naval and military officers who deal with the Middle East are their targets. Readers will find this volume filled with information and useful insight concerning the underlying factors that continue to affect the present-day politics of this region. Indeed, the authors based this book on lectures and articles presented to serving US naval and military officers. Had the information been conveyed before 2001, perhaps the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would have been conducted very differently. Political and military leaders with a better knowledge of Middle Eastern history may have made better decisions before the initiation of major military operations in the theatre.

This book is filled with many details and names of people who were influential participants in the described events. This is both good and bad. Too much detail can become tedious – the chapter on Hashemite Iraq, for example, gets a bit tedious because of the multitude of details covered. Otherwise the book reads well.

From an historical perspective, the subjugation of the Arabs by the British and French colonial masters made contact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy attractive as they were seen as possible allies in the overthrow of the colonial system. The authors point to the similarity of the role of discipline that existed in the Nazi and Fascist systems and the tenet of discipline pursued by certain followers of Islam. Despite the similarity, it is abundantly clear that the Nazis and Fascists used this idea as a convenient means to gain Arab support without disclosing their own colonial ambitions. For the Allies it was fortunate that the Axis idea did not create the necessary conditions for a successful pan-Arab alliance with Germany and Italy. It was also fortunate that the Allies defeated the German and Italian armies in North Africa before such forces could reinforce the success of Axis intelligence operations. Despite the Allied success in the Second World War, however, none of this has brought sustained peace to the Middle East or its peoples.


Reviewed by Emma Reid

In the fall of 1943, three Allied officers embarked on an historic and dangerous mission across the border states of Afghanistan. The officers traveled away from headquarters for a month to try to gain an understanding of central Asia. Two US military intelligence officers and a British officer drove in a jeep across some of the most dangerous tribal terrain in Afghanistan. This was the first introduction that most of the American military had to Afghanistan, so the trip would prove both enlightening and intriguing, as the officers confronted the region that would attain a global presence in the coming decades.

George J. Hill’s Proceed to Peshawar intertwines historical context with the personal anecdotes and the observations of the three officers, providing a detailed account of this short moment in history. The book is divided into five main sections which explore the context and background of the country, the individuals involved with the trip, their account of the trip itself, and the immediate and long-term aftermath within and outside of the region.
Hill provides great detail in describing the lives of the three officers, outlining their motivations for undertaking the trip. The jeep was driven by Gordon Enders, the US military attaché to Kabul, who likely instigated the trip, and was the only governmental representative of the United States in Afghanistan in the early 1940s. Having traveled throughout Afghanistan earlier in the decade, Enders had encountered many issues with various diplomatic representatives, providing interesting context for the mission itself. Benjamin Bromhead, the new British assistant public relations officer in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) (a part of what is now Pakistan), had spent the majority of his career in the province, and decided to take the trip in order to familiarize himself with the border, as he wanted to meet many of the tribal leaders. The third officer on the trip was Albert Zimmerman, the US naval attaché who had been trained as an intelligence officer, and who was selected as the last individual to accompany the contingent. Zimmerman wrote detailed observations of every aspect of the trip, which help tie together Hill's account of the journey. Hill's descriptions of the officers showcases his writing and research most effectively, as he takes a serious interest in the lives and personalities of the officers as they affect the trip.

The story of the trip itself, divided into 34 days, is enhanced by a series of photographs taken by Zimmerman, providing detail to the colourful descriptions of the unfamiliar terrain. Furthermore, the photos supplement the complicated descriptions of tribal territories that Enders, Bromhead and Zimmerman encounter. As the travellers were unfamiliar with customs and traditions, Zimmerman's observations illustrate their cultural education about the politics of the rural and tribal Middle East.

Hill describes the aftermath of the trip as it affected the officers' personal lives, as well as the changing landscape of the Middle East since the 1940s. However, this section of the book is the smallest. Hill's overall attempt at analysis suffers from the structure of his story. By focusing primarily on the personal lives of the officers for the first half, Hill leaves himself little room to examine the trip from a detailed historical lens. Although personal anecdotes create a colourful and intriguing story, the focus of his work seems to shift several times throughout Proceed to Peshawar.

By dividing the book into five separate sections, Proceed to Peshawar largely reads as an in-depth character study, rather than an exciting excursion through an important and largely unknown episode in history. With the intersection of great powers and powers yet to come, the topic of Hill's research is certainly important, but the account of the mission is obstructed by the story of the individuals who took part in it.

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Reviewed by Ramez Ebeid

This book is focused on the 12-year duel between the coalition led by the United States and Saddam Hussein's Iraq that lasted from 1991 to 2003 in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The focus is placed on the process of coercing the Iraqi government into agreeing with international norms and standards as set by the United Nations Security Council. The book explains why many attempts to coerce Iraq did not eventually succeed. Some attempts at setting the terms for a ceasefire made some progress but were overall unnoticed. Coercion can only be successful if both military and diplomatic options are on the table and are balanced in responding to a crisis.

*Shifting Sands* commences with a comprehensive introduction explaining the entire 12-year period starting with Kuwait falling to an Iraqi invasion. McKay explains the meaning of coercion in the following chapter to ease into the topics that follow. He sets out certain criteria to assess what should be termed an act of coercion and what should not be. In his definition, coercion has a psychological element because it relies on the enemy’s response to threat of force.

The book is framed in a scholarly manner and is filled with highly detailed tables that condense the important information. Eleven chapters highlight the main events across the specified time period. The first chapter explains the meaning of coercion and outlines the process in which coercion is carried out. The following chapters cover the three US administrations prior to Barack Obama – George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. The roles of coalition members like France, Britain, Gulf Cooperation Council states and Turkey are also discussed briefly.

The book looks at all the operations conducted in the
effort to coerce Iraq after it invaded Kuwait. Operation Desert Storm, Operation Provide Comfort 1 & 2, Operation Southern Watch, Operation Vigilant Warrior, Operation Desert Strike and Operation Desert Fox are all the missions and methods used for air coercion to convince Iraq to adhere to international norms. The author also discusses a political framework of the internal politics of Iraq and the techniques in disarming the government from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. An entire chapter is dedicated to the events of January 1993 – when coalition forces destroyed many of Iraq's missile sites – and how the Iraqi government was involved in several provocations. The bottom line is that McKay argues that in some instances coercion was effective in the short run.

The road to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is discussed in Chapter 12. This chapter discusses how on 20 March the coalition launched Operation Iraqi Freedom to remove Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athist government. McKay highlights the main factors that resulted in Operation Iraqi Freedom being launched.

The author meticulously covers most aspects of the 12-year duel in this book to highlight the failures and small successes of air coercion. The common theme in this book is the process of coercion using air power and military alliance.

Overall Shifting Sands is an excellent and descriptive book that discusses this influential period in American foreign policy that has defined four US administrations. The table of contents is detailed so readers can easily access a certain incident in the book, and it comes in both English and French. It is, however, not an easy read and requires careful reading to understand. The book is filled with many abbreviations that could be difficult for readers who do not understand the subject and so it’s useful that the author provided a list of abbreviations at the end of the book. This is followed by a selected bibliography that outlines the sources. Footnotes provide the reader with an ability to follow up on material related to air coercion and Iraq.

This book should be studied in order to understand what went wrong in the operations in Iraq between 1991 and 2003, what led the United States to invade Iraq in 2003 and what forms of diplomacy and military action were necessary to control Iraq through air coercion. In light of recent events in Iraq and the region, this book could provide a base for understanding the history of the situation in Iraq, and could be used as a means to fight a different kind of force in the present and in the future. 🎗


Reviewed by Colonel (Ret’d) Brian K. Wentzell

The editors have compiled a book that investigates the political and naval factors, strategies and arguments of each of the five states that participated in the London Naval Conference of 1930. The contributing authors reveal a web of motives, espionage and intrigue that many readers might find surprising. For example, the reader may be astounded to realize the British were reading American, Japanese, Italian and occasional French cable messages in real or near real time from the late 1920s onward. However, the focus of the book is upon the negotiations before and during the conference and the placement of the conference in the transition from the armistice that took effect on 11 November 1918 at the end of the first World War to the start of the Second World War.

The contributors discuss one chapter each on the negotiating positions of the participants who were Great Britain, the United States of America, Japan, France and Italy. Neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary was invited as they were not considered to be significant naval powers. The participants were wary of each other; however, in the end, Great Britain and the United States emerged with a degree of mutual respect and understanding that had not previously existed. Japan, the third signatory to the treaty coming out of the conference, emerged with serious internal conflict between its naval leadership and civilian government over the treaty terms. France and Italy withdrew from the proceedings before they concluded.

The earlier naval conference in Washington in 1922 had limited success. It established limits on battleships and aircraft carriers but not for the important cruiser category or submarines and auxiliaries. The Geneva Conference in 1927 failed to settle outstanding matters and the London Conference was convened to try to resolve, amongst other items, the crucial question of cruiser strength. This proved to be difficult. The definitions of ‘heavy’ and ‘light’ cruiser were agreed upon by the British, Americans and Japanese. It was the ratio for heavy and light cruiser strength that provided acceptable equality for the first two states; however, the Japanese received what they thought was an unsatisfactory lesser share. Other differences concerning lesser types of warships and on fortified overseas naval bases were resolved.
Seething with anger, the Japanese naval general staff believed the outcome was designed to relegate their country to an inferior position when compared to the United States and Great Britain. As the Japanese government, for legitimate economic and political reasons, did not share the naval leaders’ view, the seeds of domestic political discord were sown. The naval leaders went so far as to appeal directly to the public for support. This contributed to the militarization of the state, the Japanese people and ultimately encouraged Japanese nationalism and expansionism, which influenced Japan’s actions in the Second World War.

As interesting as the inter-state and intra-state discussions were, the importance of this book is linked to the larger question of the impact of disarmament negotiations. While the series of conferences that began in Washington in 1922 and concluded in London in 1930 achieved limitations of naval armaments, they did not prevent these same states from becoming embroiled in the Second World War.

Did the participants bargain too hard? Did they focus too much on naval armament issues and ignore more important political issues? I believe many of the contributing authors would conclude that arms limitation talks and treaties contribute to discord amongst states. While the protection of seaborne trade was and remains important to nearly all countries, there are countless other issues, some big and some small, that can destroy relationships amongst sovereign states. The outcome of the naval conferences demonstrated that agreed limitations on numbers and types of warships will not ensure peace.

This book provides a good base for further investigation by those interested in studying the value of arms control agreements in the creation of long-term peace. In today’s interconnected world, while the right of free passage in international waters is of crucial importance to almost every country, there is no assurance that such an internationally recognised right will discourage states from waging war on other states.

In conclusion, I recommend this book to those interested in studying the value of arms limitation agreements.

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Reviewed by Major Chris Buckham

The Boer War, fought between 1899 and 1902, has to a great extent been eclipsed by the incredible scope and violence of the two world wars that followed it. For Canada, however, the Boer War holds special significance as the first time that Canada deployed armed forces overseas and, in the course of the war, won its first Victoria Cross awarded to a Canadian as part of a formed unit (Sgt ‘Tappy’ Richardson of the Lord Strathcona’s Horse).

Boileau tells the story of Canada’s involvement in the war highlighting the specific skill sets that Canadians brought – a rugged frontier-style mindset that reflected the enemy they were engaging. The author touches upon many facets of the war from the challenges of French/English support, the impact of individual personalities such as Sam Steele, William Otter and Georgina Pope, the interface between the colonial and English forces and the strategies undertaken by the Imperial command in an effort to overcome the Boers. The book, however, is short and therefore, while these themes are introduced, they are investigated at only a cursory level whetting the readers’ appetite for more.

This is book is not intended as an in-depth analysis of the Canadian role in the Boer conflict. Instead, the author’s intent is to introduce Canadians to an element of their history not widely remembered; in this he does a commendable job. The book recounts the exploits of a number of Canadians that explain why names such as Leliefontein, Paardeburg and The Battle of the Harts River are honoured in the annals of storied Canadian units that saw their creation as a result of the war: The Royal Canadian Regiment, Canadian Mounted Rifles, The Lord Strathcona’s Horse and The Royal Canadian Dragoons.

The author also draws attention to another interesting aspect of the war for Canada: the deployment of women in the role of nursing sisters into the conflict zone. The role of the medical community was vital as the impact of diseases such as dysentery and enteric fever was more grievous than bullets on the casualty lists of the units.

As noted, the book is not meant to be a definitive account of the war – the bibliography Boileau includes provides a starting point for further reading – but I felt that additional maps of the engagements described would have been helpful. Regardless, this is a fine book for someone wanting a quick introduction to the martial history of Canada and its unique role as recognized by senior members of the British military. The courage, determination and valour shown by the Canadians serving in South Africa served as a clear indicator of the quality of soldier that would answer England’s call again a mere 12 years later.
Stories from HMCS Matapedia: The First Voyage

My first trip aboard HMCS Matapedia (K112) took us from Halifax to Iceland about December 21 1941. I had only been in Matapedia for a week and had just been acclimatized to the ship. I was one of three telegraphers on board. This was an eventful first trip. There is a famous story about a radar operator on this trip. Probably for about 10% of the crew this was our first voyage. While many of us got seasick, this fellow was very sick and out of commission from the time we left harbour until we reached Iceland. I seem to recall that he spent most of the time under a table in the radar room. Several of the officers felt that he might die because he had not eaten or taken significant liquids during the trip except for some force feeding. He was taken off in Iceland and placed on HMS Hecla, a destroyer mother ship, for assessment. The doctors there could not find anything wrong and since seasickness was not recognized as an illness he had to get back on board for the return journey.

It was even worse coming back. A day out of Iceland we hit a hurricane, with winds as high as Force 12 for a period of four days. The story within the story concerns me and one of my rookie actions. The radio room was located just behind the wheelhouse. Radios were built with vacuum tubes in those days and they, unlike today’s transistors, generate a lot of heat. There was no ventilation or air circulation in this room so I would occasionally open the door for fresh air. I was on the first watch after leaving Iceland between 8pm and 12am. Opening the door was not the right thing to do at that time. Just as I opened the door, the ship took a monster wave over the entire bridge. It took out all the windows in the wheelhouse (located just below the bridge), soaked all the charts, as well as all the electrical equipment in the radio room. The day was saved with some heroic actions of the captain Lt. Herman RCNR (a former schooner skipper from Lunenburg) and our navigating officer, Lt. Gordon RCNR, who had previously worked on merchant ships on the Great Lakes. He climbed up on the mast in front of the bridge and stood there while seamen handed up planks that he was able to secure to provide temporary protection for the wheelhouse, all while the storm continued. It took three days to dry out all the radio equipment before it was operational again. And it was not until after repairs in Halifax that the ship was really functional. During this storm we had lost contact with most of the ships in the returning convoy although once repairs to the wheelhouse were made we did pick up some stragglers.

While the corvettes were very wet and lively vessels, they did prove to be very seaworthy. And we did live to talk about it! But I digress, back to the story of the seasick radar operator. Once we reached Halifax the skipper put in a request to the brass to see what could be done to help with seasickness. As a result of this, the radar operator was given a series of tests. It was through this initiative that the Canadian Navy assigned Dr. Best (famous for the development of insulin for the treatment of diabetes) and another doctor from Montreal, whose name I don’t know, to work on the problem. As a result an anti-seasickness pill was developed and made available – a significant step forward. 🏷
The new CH-148 Cyclone helicopter sits on display as part of the unveiling ceremony at 12 Wing Shearwater, Nova Scotia, on 19 June 2015.

Credit: Avr. Desiree T. Bourdon, Canadian Forces Combat Camera