AOR


AORs are essential and urgently required

The unexpected press release announcing the termination of procurement processes for two new types of ships for the Canadian Coast Guard and navy was no doubt a heavy blow. And for the perennially under funded coast guard, the indefinite delay for the twelve new patrol ships they’d been counting on […]

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Vindication for more visionary naval requirements and procurement programs

The government, national defence, naval priorities and expeditionary requirements have not been well served by explanations for reconsideration of the approved JSS program given the economic importance and operational urgency in replacement of the old fleet supply vessels. These have focused on bids that have greatly exceeded a badly miscalculated budget for capital and support allowances.  This was set in the face […]

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JSS capability gap

I was the communications officer on HMCS Protecteur when she was deployed to East Timor in 1999. While we did yeoman work supporting forces ashore with fuel, stores and an ‘RnR’ platform for allied troops, our many shortcomings were painfully obvious. We could not communicate with our own troops ashore, […]

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Dr. Elinor Sloan’s comments from her book “Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era.”

Having just reviewed Dr. Sloan’s book (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005) for Canadian Naval Review, her comments on the JSS are fresh in my mind.  Sloan wrote that “rapid deployability is dependent upon the existence of strategic lift, including airlift and sealift.”  She is concerned that only three JSS will provide […]

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Arguments for increased investment in the Joint Support Ship Project

The Government is presently debating whether to buy two or three of the Joint Support Ships, and how to resolve its bidding dilemma. Both teams, led respectively by SNC-Lavalin Profac Inc. and Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems Canada, were unable to deliver three ships for the amount stipulated by the government. […]

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The AOR – JSS ‘Gap’

This February, David Pugliese reported that a leaked copy of the Canada First Defence Strategy would retire our current AOR in 2010, two years before the JSS was delivered in 2012. Many critiqued this plan as it cut a critical capability without providing any savings. I called the plan “harebrained” […]

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The Canadian Naval Task Group (II)

Everything that Peter Haydon says in his article on the “Canadian Naval Task Group” is accurate. The task group has been fundamental to our past success and it will likely be equally critical to our navy’s future. The problem, however, is that the world is changing and the task group […]

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The Canadian Naval Task Group

As its operational focal point, the modern Canadian navy uses a “multi-purpose, combat-capable task group.” This policy is consistent with the 1994 Defence White Paper which calls for the navy to maintain such a task group on each coast. The exact size and capability of those groups is not specified […]

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Debating Defence and Naval Policy (X)

The plan would scrap both remaining AORs (the 3rd was binned in the mid-90s to make way for an anticipated replacement – still not realized!), and they are just as necessary for our homeland defence. It will be recalled that we got the first of our own AORs after the […]

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Debating Defence and Naval Policy (IX)

David Perry: Then on 5 February, Senator Colin Kenny kept-up the momentum with an article in the Ottawa Citizen in which he expressed great concern over the proposed funding concept for military modernization. The new plans, Kenny believed, contained three bad options none of which would solve the Canadian Forces’ […]

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