Sub signals

More analysis of nuclear and conventional capabilities*

*Moderator’s Note: This statement originally appeared as part of an exchange between members on the Naval Affairs Discussion of the Naval Association of Canada. It is reprinted here with the permission of the author. My thanks to Mr. Jim Carruthers for bringing it to my attention.

Here are my thoughts on the Victoria-class and the SSN option.

In a nutshell, we went up, down, and around the buoy chasing the SSN option about two and one-half decades ago.  The chase or pursuit resulted in the navy having to sacrifice CASAP (conventional submarine replacement program or replacing Oberon with the SSK and not the SSN option) and CPF Batch III in order to fund the SSN acquisition.  Those two programs never returned following the demise of the SSN Program (formally launched in the 1987 White Paper and subsequently cancelled in Michael Wilson’s 1989 Federal Budget).  Yes, Wilson cancelled the program and not Beatty who had been relieved of his functions as MND two months prior.  I suggest the navy should resist revisiting any option linked in any way to nuclear propulsion.

It would be easy to criticize the Victoria-class acquisition, as so many unfortunate ‘things’ went wrong, starting, first and foremost, with the five-year gap between Oberon’s paying off and HMCS Victoria arriving in Halifax.  Added to this is the fact that the quick four to six months ‘Canadianization’ work period turned into a two-year EWP.  I could write a book about this but will not, as I would have to point the finger in too many directions, at both uniformed and non-uniformed folks…

The Victoria-class was acquired purely on capability and certainly not on merit when compared to other similar platforms.  As an aside, there was another option out there for a short period of time, the Dutch Walrus-class.  However, the RNlN fought hard to keep them and eventually convinced its government to reverse course.  In fact, the 1994 Statement on Defence identified the Upholder-class as the only affordable option for Canada.  From that statement on defence, it took about four years to obtain a decision from government, which resulted in a cold, rather than hot, turnover from the RN (boats sat alongside mothballed four years).  And the story continues through the years to this day…

The recent Corner Brook incident has somewhat dampened optimism, but with continued determination Victoria should start work ups imminently, if it is not already started.  The greatest challenge for our navy today is submarine ‘sea legs’.  Our sailors simply do not have sea experience commensurate with rank and responsibility.  Dynamic trainers are great but do not replace sea time.  Work ups, leading to Weapons Certification status early next year, must therefore be achieved at a ‘baby step’ pace, to avoid reoccurrence of incidents such as we heard about last June (i.e., Corner Brook).  There is light at the end of the tunnel, though, with Windsor due out of refit next year and Chicoutimi in 2013.  Sea experience will return but not for some time…

Now back to SSNs briefly.  Great platforms, great speed and incredible endurance limited only by the amount of food carried.  Navigating under ice is a huge challenge and finding soft spots (thin-ice) to surface is always a concern in the event something goes wrong – fire, flood, famine, etc... I would argue, therefore, that the greater benefit to Canada, other than driving fancy sports car up north, would translate into exercising greater sovereignty under ice by having to exchange our submarine movements with allied navies.  I could also write a book about this but will not – potentially too much fun and I am not yet retired.

Finally, note that CTV should devote its W5 time slot to submarines on November 12th.  Lloyd Robertson already interviewed many past and present leaders on the Victoria-class acquisition – not sure what spin is intended…

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