The Long War’s Arms Race: Update


An interesting article/post by David Perry. It seems, now I may be wrong, that the navies of the world tried to play the "up armour" game in the last century. It also seems to me that eventually it dawned on someone that more armour against bigger bangs was not the answer! The issue became essentially the evolution of tactics, doctrine and technology to defeat the threat at sea. The winner of the race to advance all three won at sea. The key was the ability to exercise command and control and integrated ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) above, below and on the surface. While I understand that fighting a land war is not exactly the same as fighting a sea war, be it blue or brown water, our army is mostly focused on more armour and not the tools that created success for allied navies throughout history.

I realize that any lessons from the navy are not 'Jarmy, and therefore not generally deemed to be helpful but, I would have hoped that the leadership of the CF was bigger than narrow parochialism. A case in point is the failure to address air coordination. It was one of the navy's early lessons. Most of the ordinance delivered on target in Afghanistan is dropped by aircraft, yet the Canadian army has yet to figure out that tactical air coordination is a requirement. They have been forced to adopt some measures as a result of friendly fire incidents but have yet to develop or adopt a methodology for air coordination that is of any real timely value. The same goes for IEDs. No method other than more armour. No integrated approach to interdict the entire chain of events from planning, developing, deploying, planting, arming of IEDs. No method of detailed route survey, the list goes on! Essentially, hard learned lessons and methodologies that have succeeded in other operational environments are not being focused to counter the threat.

So, more armour and more defeats!

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